Training and Recruitment

Recruitment and training serve different purposes

An army needs both enough people and people who can fight effectively. Recruitment is the process of obtaining troops; training prepares them for military service. A ruler might gather thousands of men quickly, but without practice, equipment and discipline they would not necessarily form an effective army.

Across British history, recruitment increasingly moved away from obligations to individual landowners towards forces organised by the state. Training also became more regular and specialised. However, these changes were gradual: paid soldiers, compulsory service and part-time forces existed alongside one another.

Medieval armies: land in return for service

The feudal system linked landholding to loyalty and service. A king granted land to leading nobles, known as tenants-in-chief, who promised to support him and provide soldiers. These nobles granted some of their land to lesser nobles and knights, who owed military service in return. When the king required troops, obligations passed down this chain.

Troops raised through these obligations formed the feudal levy. Service was normally required for 40 days and could be extended to 90 days during conflict. This helped a king assemble an army without maintaining it permanently, but the limited service period was a serious weakness during long campaigns.

Military obligations extended beyond knights. Freemen could be required to provide a man from their family for military duty. Lords also expected service from peasants and serfs through their authority over them. Medieval armies therefore contained men with very different levels of preparation.

Knights trained from a young age, progressing through service as a page and then a squire. They practised riding and using weapons. Many ordinary infantrymen had much less formal training and fought with basic equipment. Raising men and preparing skilled fighters were not the same thing.

Money and wider military obligations

As the economy became more money-based, payment increasingly offered an alternative to personal feudal service. Scutage was money paid instead of the military service owed. Kings could use money to employ mercenaries: soldiers whose service depended on payment rather than a landholding obligation.

This gave rulers another way to obtain troops, but it also changed the basis of loyalty. A mercenary fought for wages, whereas a feudal soldier owed service through his relationship with a lord.

The Assize of Arms provided another means of preparing men for service. Freemen aged 16–60 were obliged to swear allegiance and possess and bear arms for the king. Their equipment was to reflect their rank and wealth. This continued the principle behind the earlier Saxon fyrd: men could be required to undertake military service for defence. It did not mean that everyone became a permanently employed soldier.

Chivalry: the knight’s ideal of service

Chivalry was a moral and social code associated with knights, especially during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It connected military service with courage, loyalty and honour. A knight was expected to serve his lord bravely, respect an enemy honourably and behave courteously in peacetime.

The Song of Roland, completed around 1098–1100, expressed ideals including reverence for God and the Church, faithful service to one’s lord, protection of the weak and defenceless, living honourably and respecting women. Stories of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table also presented models of knightly behaviour.

Chivalry helped explain why a knight should serve and how he should behave; it was not a recruitment system or a guarantee of good conduct. Its importance was closely connected to the social position of knights. As commerce expanded and wealthy merchants gained influence, power became less exclusively tied to landed nobles, weakening the dominance of the knightly class.

Tudor armies: inspecting many men, training selected men

The Tudor rulers needed forces capable of defending the country while limiting the independent military power of nobles. The Wars of the Roses had demonstrated the dangers posed by powerful noble armies.

The Tudors continued compulsory military obligations through county militias. Men aged 16–60 were required to attend a muster, where their readiness and equipment could be inspected. In periods of danger, musters could take place as often as twice a year. Commissioners organised them; during Mary I’s reign, Lords Lieutenant took over this responsibility. The clergy, lords and their retainers had similar obligations administered separately.

Most men returned home after inspection unless an invasion threatened. This system allowed a large force to be assembled without keeping all its members permanently under arms. Its weakness was that many men received little more than basic training.

From 1573, selected men from the general muster formed Trained Bands. They were retained for additional drill, paid for by the relevant city or council. The growing use of firearms and the skill needed to handle pikes made extra training important. Repeated practice helped men perform military actions together rather than fight as an uncoordinated crowd.

For overseas campaigns, particularly in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, men were often pressed — forced — into the army. These paid soldiers could receive weapons and armour from the county militia or Trained Bands. Thus compulsory recruitment and payment already operated together before the emergence of a more professional army. Although the militia declined during the seventeenth century, it remained important enough for both sides to seek control of it during the Civil Wars.

The New Model Army: a move towards professionalism

When the Civil War began in 1642, commanders commonly came from the nobility and gentry, whose social position was treated as a qualification for command. Much of the infantry consisted of pressed men. Irregular pay encouraged soldiers to plunder local communities, while poor discipline and desertion weakened armies.

In December 1644, Sir William Waller proposed reorganising Parliament’s forces into a national army. The New Model Army, established in 1645, represented a move towards a full-time, professional standing army rather than dependence on locally raised forces.

The Self-denying Ordinance, passed in April 1645, required members of both Houses of Parliament to give up military commands. This helped separate political office from military leadership. Thomas Fairfax became the army’s commander, while Oliver Cromwell ultimately continued in command of its cavalry as Lieutenant General.

The army had an intended strength of about 22,000 men. Its organisation included 12 infantry regiments of 1,200 men, with two musketeers for every pikeman; 11 cavalry regiments of 600 men; a regiment of dragoons, or mounted infantry; and an artillery train of 50 guns.

Its importance lay not simply in size but in organisation. Soldiers received military training and regular pay and were subject to strict discipline. Cromwell supported promotion on ability, allowing men to rise from the ranks rather than relying only on high birth. Regular pay addressed one cause of plundering, while training and discipline helped soldiers operate as a dependable force.

Naval press gangs: compulsion continued

Professional organisation did not end forced recruitment. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, especially in wartime, the navy used impressment to obtain sailors. Voluntary recruitment was difficult because conditions aboard ships were harsh and wartime service was dangerous.

Press gangs commonly consisted of 10–12 men led by an officer. They sought recruits in naval towns, including their taverns. Men with seafaring experience, particularly merchant sailors aged 18–55, were especially likely to be targeted because they already possessed useful skills. Recruiters used threats, drink and physical force.

This was a different mechanism from the feudal levy: a man could be seized for state service rather than summoned through a landholding obligation. Yet both demonstrate a continuity — military service was not always freely chosen.

After 1853, the introduction of continuous naval service and retirement pensions reduced the need for impressment. A more stable career and better long-term rewards made service more attractive and helped retain experienced men.

Army recruiting parties: persuading men to enlist

During the eighteenth century and into the mid-nineteenth century, army recruiting parties and parades sought men at markets, fairs and alehouses. Unlike naval press gangs, these parties offered a route into voluntary army service. Men could enlist for 8–12 years or sign up for ‘life’, which usually meant 21 years.

Pay was poor but regular, so enlistment could offer an escape from poverty. Excitement and the prospect of plunder also attracted recruits, despite harsh discipline. In wartime, convicts could be offered release if they joined. These incentives show that volunteering could reflect economic pressure as well as enthusiasm for military life.

Compulsion continued alongside voluntary enlistment. The Militia Act of 1757 provided for militia recruitment by ballot: men selected were required to serve for five years. The army and militia therefore did not rely on a single recruitment method.

Nineteenth-century reforms: a more organised professional army

The Crimean War and the Indian Rebellion of 1857 exposed weaknesses in army administration, supply and leadership, as well as the gulf between officers and ordinary soldiers. After becoming Prime Minister in 1868, William Gladstone appointed Edward Cardwell as Secretary of State for War. Cardwell introduced reforms to modernise the army. Prussia’s victory over France in 1870–71 added to the pressure by demonstrating the strength of a well-organised military system.

The Army Enlistment Act of 1870 established a twelve-year commitment: six years in the army followed by six in the reserves. This combined full-time service with a pool of experienced men who could be recalled when needed. It also offered an alternative to spending most of one’s working life in the army.

In 1871, the purchase of officers’ commissions was abolished. Wealth would no longer provide the same route to buying military rank, strengthening the movement towards professional leadership rather than command based on social position.

In 1872, regiments were reorganised around two linked battalions, one at home and one overseas, with local attachments for recruitment. Further reorganisation in 1881 brought regular and militia battalions into locally named territorial regiments with local depots. Local organisation made recruitment more systematic, while links between home and overseas units supported the army’s wider commitments.

First World War recruitment: building a mass volunteer army

When Britain entered the First World War on 4 August 1914, its professional army numbered fewer than 250,000, and the British Expeditionary Force numbered about 80,000. This was too small for a prolonged war on a large scale. Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, expected the conflict to last at least three years and require at least a million men.

On 6 August, Parliament authorised an increase of half a million men. A major recruiting campaign followed, with offices established in towns and cities. Amid a surge of patriotism, the target was reached by the end of September.

Many early recruits were young, single men. Pals’ Battalions allowed men who knew one another to join and serve together. Joining with friends made enlistment more attractive, but concentrated losses could devastate the communities from which these units came. Recruitment was broadened by raising the enlistment age limit to 35 and encouraging married men to join.

Recruitment depended on persuasion and social pressure as well as patriotic feeling. A white feather could be given to a man in civilian clothes as an accusation of cowardice. This put pressure on men to demonstrate that they were willing to serve, rather than allowing enlistment to remain an entirely private choice.

Recruitment propaganda: making enlistment feel like a duty

Propaganda seeks to influence attitudes and behaviour. Recruitment propaganda aimed to turn feelings such as patriotism, pride, fear and anger into a decision to volunteer. Posters could reach people repeatedly in public places, using a short message that was easy to remember. Appeals to ‘do their bit’ presented enlistment as a duty to the country. Other messages stressed the danger of invasion, German atrocities and male pride.

The 1915 poster ‘Women of Britain Say — GO!’ combined a large, direct command with an image of two women and a child watching soldiers march past outside their window. The family group connected military service with protecting home and loved ones. By presenting women as encouraging men to leave, it also suggested that a man would earn approval by enlisting. This tells us how recruiters tried to persuade men; it does not prove that all women supported enlistment or that everyone who saw the poster joined.

‘Remember Scarborough!’, published by the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee in December 1914, used the German naval bombardment of Scarborough as a recruiting appeal. Eighteen people had been killed in the town, including children. Invoking this attack could turn outrage over civilian deaths and fear for British homes into reasons to volunteer. Propaganda selected events and framed the enemy to provoke a response: an account used for persuasion should not automatically be treated as a complete, balanced account of the war.

Film and public endorsement reinforced these messages. Britain Prepared, released in December 1915, used military footage to promote British strength and determination. It ran for six weeks at the Empire Theatre in London, with a shorter version distributed to cinemas nationwide. Politicians such as Winston Churchill spoke at rallies, while King George V supported the campaign and appealed for people to pull together. Familiar public figures could give the recruiting appeal authority and encourage a sense of shared national duty.

The limits of persuasion and the need to maintain morale

The Derby Scheme attempted to preserve voluntary recruitment by placing volunteers on a reserve list to be called up if needed. They wore a khaki armband with a red crown on civilian clothing, signalling their willingness to serve and helping protect them from white-feather accusations.

However, persuasion did not supply everyone the army needed. Under the scheme, 38% of single men and 54% of married men outside reserved occupations did not sign up. The move to conscription in 1916 shows the limits of relying on volunteers, even after the initial success of the 1914 campaign. Propaganda helped encourage enlistment, but it could not guarantee enough recruits for a long war with heavy losses.

By 1917, propaganda also had the task of maintaining public support for an increasingly costly war. David Lloyd George’s government established the National War Aims Committee. It worked with businesses such as W. H. Smith to distribute pamphlets. Illustrated newspapers presented the war heroically while playing down its horrors and casualties. This was morale propaganda, intended to sustain commitment to the war, rather than the beginning of the volunteer recruiting campaign.

First World War conscription: service required by law

Conscription was introduced in January 1916, initially for eligible unmarried men; it was extended to married men later that year. Men aged 18–41 were liable for call-up, with the upper limit raised to 51 in the final months of the war. Unlike impressment, which involved seizing particular men, conscription used legislation to impose service on eligible groups.

There were exemptions for medical unfitness and for work considered essential, including mining, engineering and munitions production. Clergymen and teachers were also exempted. These arrangements reflected a practical problem: the country needed workers to sustain the war effort as well as soldiers to fight.

Around 16,000 conscientious objectors refused to fight on moral or religious grounds. About 7,000 accepted non-combat service, including dangerous work as stretcher-bearers at the front. Refusing to fight did not necessarily mean refusing all service. Around 6,000 were imprisoned, illustrating the conflict between compulsory national service and individual conscience.

Conscription brought in about 1.1 million men in its first year and 2.5 million by the end of the war. It supplied manpower that voluntary methods had not secured, but it also provoked opposition. Its effectiveness in raising troops did not mean that everyone accepted the government’s right to compel service.

Compulsory service returns in 1939

With another war approaching, the Military Training Act of 1939 allowed men aged 20–22 to be called up for six months’ training. This was Britain’s first introduction of conscription in peacetime: the state required preparation before war had actually begun.

When Britain declared war on 3 September 1939, the National Service (Armed Forces) Act made men aged 18–40 eligible for call-up. The upper age limit rose to 51 in 1941. As in the First World War, reserved occupations protected essential civilian work from losing all its manpower to the armed forces.

Compulsory service could also support industry directly. From 1943, the Bevin Boys, named after Minister of Labour Ernest Bevin, were directed into coal mining. Coal was essential to the war economy, so contributing to victory did not always mean serving as a soldier.

Conscientious objectors again had their claims examined by tribunals. They were treated more humanely than during the First World War, and many undertook non-combat duties or civilian work on farms and in hospitals. The repeated use of compulsion was a continuity, but its administration and treatment of objectors could change.

Post-war National Service: compulsory service in peacetime

Compulsory military service continued after the Second World War. The post-war National Service system was introduced in 1948 and came into operation on 1 January 1949. Medically fit men aged 17–21 were expected to serve in the armed forces for an initial term of 18 months, followed by four years on the reserve list.

Unlike wartime call-up, this system maintained a supply of trained personnel when Britain was no longer fighting a world war. It provided men for units at home and abroad and created a reserve that could be called upon when needed. Most National Servicemen served in the army or RAF; the navy took relatively few.

Service was compulsory, but not everyone was immediately available. Men working in key industries were exempt, and service could be deferred, or postponed, while young men completed higher education. As in wartime, the state had to balance military manpower against civilian needs.

After about ten weeks of basic training, men joined units at home or overseas. Their experiences varied greatly. Some faced active service and died, some learned useful trades, and others spent much of their time on routine drill, commonly called ‘square-bashing’. National Service was therefore neither simply a training course nor a freely chosen military career: it interrupted civilian life and could involve dangerous operational duties.

Call-ups ended in 1960, marking Britain’s return to reliance on a standing, volunteer army. Men already serving still had their commitments to complete. The crucial change in recruitment was that the army would obtain new personnel through voluntary enlistment rather than compulsory peacetime intake.

Career soldiers: a smaller volunteer force with specialist skills

After National Service, Britain increasingly relied on people who chose military service as a career. Full-time professional personnel are called regulars; reservists provide additional trained manpower and can be called into service. Career service allowed experience to accumulate rather than continually replacing short-term compulsory recruits.

The army became smaller in the decades following National Service. The ending of the Cold War brought further reductions: the 1990 defence review led to a reduction of about 50,000, leaving around 102,000 regular army personnel. This was a different model from the mass armies raised during the world wars — a smaller professional force rather than compulsory service for a large section of the population.

Recruitment offered a long-term career, not a brief obligation attached to age or landholding. Long-term voluntary service enabled soldiers to build experience and develop their skills.

Training became increasingly specialised as military roles diversified. A typical army training route involved about 14 weeks of basic training, followed by roughly a year of specialist preparation. Engineers, medics and pilots needed different skills, so preparation could not consist only of weapon handling and drill. This continued the earlier connection between changing military needs and more demanding training, already visible in the Tudor Trained Bands.

Officers also followed organised professional training routes. Army officers trained at Sandhurst, with a course of about 44 weeks, before specialising in areas such as combat, communications, engineering or logistics. RAF officers undertook about six months of initial officer training, followed by specialist preparation. Royal Navy officers trained at the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth, then at sea, before further specialisation. These routes show how military leadership increasingly depended on structured preparation rather than simply wealth or high birth.

Judging change and continuity

There was substantial change in who organised forces and how soldiers were prepared. Feudal obligations linked service to land and personal lordship; Tudor authorities inspected county forces; the New Model Army developed national organisation, regular pay and disciplined training. Nineteenth-century reforms made recruitment and reserve arrangements more systematic, while career forces developed longer, specialist preparation.

However, recruitment did not move steadily from compulsion to freedom. Tudor pressing, naval press gangs, militia ballots and twentieth-century conscription all required service in different ways. National Service continued compulsion into peacetime before the return to voluntary recruitment. Paid service also remained important, from medieval mercenaries to career soldiers, while part-time forces continued alongside full-time troops.

A justified judgement is that organisation and training changed more consistently towards professionalism than recruitment changed towards voluntary service. Recruitment repeatedly adapted to the scale of demand: volunteers could sustain a professional force, but the world wars brought compulsory mass mobilisation. The ending of National Service was a major change towards voluntary career recruitment, not the inevitable outcome of an uninterrupted trend.