Attitudes to Just War Theory

What makes a war ‘just’?

Just War theory asks whether fighting can ever be morally justified, and what limits must apply if it is. Calling a war just does not mean that its suffering is good. It means arguing that, in exceptional circumstances, fighting may be less wrong than allowing aggression or oppression to continue.

The theory addresses two separate questions: Should this war begin? and How should it be fought? A defensible reason for going to war does not make every action during that war acceptable. For example, defending a population against invasion does not justify deliberately attacking enemy civilians.

The familiar Western theory developed within Christianity. Augustine contributed to it in the fourth century, and Thomas Aquinas developed its principles in the thirteenth century. Later developments extended the discussion of restrictions on warfare. Its importance is that it offers a way to challenge claims that war is necessary and to limit harm when fighting occurs.

Hindus can assess these conditions through their own teachings. The Christian origins of this particular theory do not mean that Hindu ideas about righteous warfare came from Christianity.

Conditions governing the decision to fight

Just War theory places restrictions on the reasons, authority and intentions behind war:

• Just cause: there must be a morally defensible reason, such as self-defence or protecting innocent people from oppression. Wanting more territory or wealth is not enough.
• Legitimate authority: war must be declared by a recognised authority, such as a lawful government, rather than started by individuals seeking private revenge.
• Right intention: the aim must be to establish a just peace, not to gain power, take revenge or destroy an enemy population.
• Last resort: peaceful alternatives, such as negotiation and diplomacy, must have been exhausted before fighting begins.

These conditions work together. A government might have legitimate authority but still fight for an unjust cause. Equally, claiming to protect people does not establish that peaceful alternatives have genuinely been tried.

Conditions governing how war is fought

Proportionality limits the harm caused. The force used must not be excessive, and the harm resulting from war should not outweigh the good it is intended to achieve. A response that devastates a population to address a limited threat would be difficult to justify.

Discrimination means distinguishing between those fighting and those not fighting. Civilians must not be deliberately targeted. Here, ‘discrimination’ means making a morally important distinction, not treating people unfairly because of their identity.

These restrictions continue throughout a war. An initially defensible war can be fought unjustly. This is also why modern weapons raise difficult questions: widespread destruction may make it extremely difficult to protect civilians and keep force proportionate.

Hindu teachings: non-violence and righteous duty

Two central Hindu ideas help explain different responses to war. Ahimsa is non-violence or avoiding harm to living beings. Dharma concerns righteousness and duty. They normally support peaceful conduct, but conflict creates a difficult question: what should someone do when preventing injustice appears to require force?

Some Hindus accept dharmayuddha, meaning righteous war. On this view, violence can be justified to uphold dharma after peaceful methods have failed. Refusing to defend vulnerable people could allow a greater injustice to continue. This connects with the Just War requirements of just cause and last resort.

Other Hindus give greater weight to ahimsa. They argue that war kills, damages communities and can create further hatred. Non-violent resistance, dialogue and reconciliation offer ways to oppose wrongdoing without reproducing violence. Concern about karma—the moral consequences of actions—can also discourage harmful conduct.

The disagreement is therefore not simply between people who value peace and people who do not. It concerns whether force can ever be a morally acceptable means of protecting peace and righteousness.

Bhagavad Gita 2.31–38: Arjuna’s responsibility

The Bhagavad Gita is set within the Mahabharata, against the background of the Kurukshetra war. Arjuna is a warrior who hesitates to fight because people he respects, including teachers, stand on the opposing side. Krishna responds to his distress by explaining his duty.

In 2.31, Krishna tells Arjuna that, considering his duty as a kshatriya, there is no better engagement than ‘fighting on religious principles’. A kshatriya belongs to the traditional warrior and ruling class. The argument concerns righteous fighting as part of Arjuna’s particular responsibility, not permission for anyone to wage any war.

In 2.32–33, Krishna describes such an opportunity as spiritually significant and warns that refusing this duty would incur sin. In 2.34–36, he explains that Arjuna would also lose his honour: other warriors would interpret his withdrawal as fear. In 2.37, he presents the possible outcomes—death followed by heaven, or victory and an earthly kingdom—and urges Arjuna to fight.

However, 2.38 adds an important qualification: Arjuna should fight ‘without considering happiness or distress, loss or gain, victory or defeat’. He should act from duty rather than selfish attachment to the outcome.

Hindus who accept righteous warfare can use this passage to argue that refusing to fight is not always morally right. Sometimes duty requires resistance to wrongdoing. The emphasis on acting without selfish gain also connects with right intention: fighting for personal reward is different from fighting to uphold righteousness.

A contrasting interpretation gives greater emphasis to the spiritual struggle represented by the narrative: overcoming selfishness and ignorance. Hindus who prioritise ahimsa need not treat Krishna’s instruction to a particular warrior as a general authorisation for modern warfare.

Applying situation ethics

Situation ethics was developed by Joseph Fletcher in the 1960s. Its central principle is to do the most loving thing in the particular circumstances. This means selfless concern for others, not affection for one’s own side alone. It is an ethical approach that can be applied to Hindu debates, rather than a distinctively Hindu teaching.

Suppose an aggressor is attacking innocent people. A situation ethicist could argue that limited defensive force is the most loving response if it protects them and prevents greater suffering. Avoiding all violence might leave victims without protection.

The same approach could reject war where negotiations could protect people, or where fighting would produce much greater suffering. The circumstances, motives and likely consequences matter; neither ‘always fight’ nor ‘never fight’ automatically answers the question.

There is an important difference from Just War theory. Just War theory sets several conditions that must govern war. Situation ethics makes selfless love the overriding principle, so it might reach a different judgement if applying a particular condition rigidly would fail to protect people.

Its flexibility is a strength because conflicts differ. Its weakness is uncertainty: leaders may disagree about what is most loving, misjudge consequences or disguise self-interest as concern for others. Firm restrictions on targeting civilians provide safeguards that should not be casually dismissed.

Can a Just War actually be possible?

An argument in favour is that defending people against serious injustice can uphold dharma. Bhagavad Gita 2.31–38 supports the possibility that fighting may be a duty when it is righteous and free from selfish motives. Just War conditions then restrict when and how that duty may be carried out.

An argument against is that ahimsa rules out deliberately causing the suffering that war involves. Even someone who accepts righteous war in principle may doubt that modern warfare can remain proportionate and protect civilians. Governments’ claims about justice and peaceful intentions may also be unreliable.

A justified conclusion needs to weigh these arguments. One possible judgement is that war could be justified exceptionally to protect people, but only where peaceful alternatives have failed and the conduct of war remains restricted. Another is that the harm and uncertainty of warfare make non-violent resistance the more defensible response. The key is to explain why the chosen judgement is stronger, rather than simply announcing a preference.