Resistance, Armed Struggle and the Rivonia Trial

Why resistance changed in the early 1960s

Resistance to apartheid challenged both racial discrimination and the white minority’s control of political power. Black South Africans faced restrictions on movement, unequal rights and exclusion from national government. Opponents therefore sought more than adjustments to individual laws: they wanted a different relationship between the people and the state.

The African National Congress (ANC) had advocated non-violent resistance. Demonstrations and stay-aways from work allowed people to challenge the government collectively without taking up arms. However, peaceful protest depended on people being able to organise and on the government being willing to respond rather than simply suppress them.

The Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960, followed by mass arrests and the banning of the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), helped convince resistance leaders that these methods were no longer sufficient. Banning did not end opposition, but it made open political activity much more difficult. Some leaders went into exile; others remained in South Africa and organised underground. State repression therefore weakened resistance while also encouraging a change in its methods.

The Freedom Charter: a continuing programme for change

The Freedom Charter was adopted at the Congress of the People at Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on 25–26 June 1955. Around 3,000 delegates attended, drawn from different racial groups and sections of society. The ANC and its allies had gathered demands for the kind of country people wanted to live in.

Its central declaration was that South Africa belonged to ‘all who live in it, black and white’. This rejected the idea that one racial group should dominate the country. The Charter called for every adult to have the right to vote and stand for public office, equal rights for national groups, equality before the law and freedom to speak, meet and organise. It also demanded the abolition of pass laws.

The Charter connected political freedom with economic change. It called for land to be shared among those who worked it and for mineral wealth, banks and monopoly industries to come under public ownership. The intended transformation was therefore broader than gaining the vote: it also challenged inequalities in access to land and wealth.

Its continuing importance in the 1960s was that it supplied a common programme for the ANC and its allies even when their methods changed. At its 1969 conference at Morogoro, the ANC reaffirmed the Charter as the programme it intended to achieve through armed struggle. Taking up arms did not mean abandoning its stated goal of a democratic, non-racial South Africa.

The Charter’s influence should not be confused with immediate success. It united supporters around an alternative to apartheid, but its demands remained aspirations rather than rights delivered by the government.

Umkhonto we Sizwe: the ANC turns to armed struggle

The decision to use violence was controversial within the ANC. Leaders committed to non-violence, including Chief Albert Luthuli, were troubled by the change. Nelson Mandela argued that a government which answered peaceful protest with violence had left opponents without an effective peaceful alternative.

On 16 December 1961, Umkhonto we Sizwe, meaning ‘Spear of the Nation’ and usually shortened to MK, publicly launched its campaign with sabotage attacks in Durban, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. Mandela became its commander-in-chief. MK used sabotage: deliberate destruction or damage intended to disrupt an opponent’s activities. This was a major departure from demonstrations and stay-aways because resistance now included organised attacks rather than only refusal to cooperate.

MK’s initial targets were property and infrastructure, including government offices, electricity pylons and telephone cables. In Durban, members attacked the pass office in Ordinance Road and an electricity pylon at Morningside. The pass office represented the controls on Black people’s movement, while damaging electricity and communications infrastructure could disrupt the operation of the state. The pass-office bomb caused little damage, but the pylon attack was more successful.

The National High Command instructed members to avoid loss of life. This distinguished MK’s initial sabotage policy from deliberate attacks on people. For example, Joe Slovo abandoned an attack on Johannesburg’s Drill Hall after finding cleaners working inside. However, an intention to avoid deaths did not make sabotage safe: one MK member died when his own bomb exploded during the launch operations.

The first attacks caused limited damage overall, but advertised the start of armed resistance and demonstrated that banning the ANC had not eliminated opposition. Operating secretly also created difficulties. Underground networks were vulnerable to police discovery, while arrests could remove experienced organisers and disrupt communication. The government’s security forces remained powerful enough to inflict serious defeats on the movement.

Poqo: violent resistance linked to the PAC

Poqo developed from the PAC’s task force around 1960 and revived through underground cells in 1961. Like the ANC, the PAC had experienced banning and the imprisonment of its leaders. Poqo treated violence as a means of overthrowing the government, but, unlike MK’s initial policy of sabotage intended to avoid deaths, it directly targeted people.

Poqo was particularly active in the Western Cape and Transkei. Its recruitment drew on anger at pass controls and at officials who abused their authority. In the Transkei, resentment of government-backed chiefs also encouraged resistance. Poqo attacked police, suspected informers, chiefs associated with the apartheid state and white civilians. This made its violence a threat not only to state officials but also to people it regarded as enemies or collaborators.

A significant example was the Paarl attack on 22 November 1962. Poqo members attacked a police station and sought to free imprisoned comrades; houses and businesses were also attacked. Two white civilians and five Poqo members were killed. In the Transkei, repeated attempts to kill the government-supporting chief Kaizer Matanzima failed, although they frightened chiefs and forced the authorities to respond.

Poqo’s impact was therefore mixed. It challenged local authority and showed the depth of hostility to apartheid, but its killings also terrorised communities. Fear of reprisals could silence residents rather than demonstrate freely given support. Police arrests, trials, imprisonment and executions severely damaged the organisation. By June 1963, 3,246 PAC members had been arrested nationally. Poqo had not achieved its intended countrywide overthrow of the government.

The Rivonia Trial: a defeat for underground resistance

In July 1963, police arrested leading members of the ANC’s underground movement at Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia, near Johannesburg. Those arrested included Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada and Dennis Goldberg. They had been discussing Operation Mayibuye, a plan for overthrowing the government. Mandela was already in custody.

The Rivonia Trial ran from 1963 into 1964. In June 1964, Mandela and seven other defendants received life sentences following convictions for sabotage-related offences. Mandela was imprisoned on Robben Island.

The immediate consequence was a major weakening of organised resistance inside South Africa. The government had removed much of the experienced underground leadership, making it harder to coordinate armed action and maintain networks. Combined with the repression of Poqo, this helped the state suppress internal resistance during the mid-1960s. Armed struggle had not brought apartheid close to collapse.

Yet imprisonment did not end the ANC. Oliver Tambo led the organisation in exile, allowing political organisation and overseas campaigning to continue. The trial also attracted international attention and condemnation, including from the United Nations Security Council. It strengthened international pressure against the apartheid government, although that pressure did not produce an immediate end to apartheid.

How effective was resistance?

Different methods achieved different things. The Freedom Charter sustained a shared vision of a future South Africa. MK’s sabotage showed that opposition survived banning, but its early attacks caused limited damage and its underground leadership was vulnerable to arrest. Poqo challenged officials and chiefs, but its direct attacks also caused civilian deaths and fear. Rivonia demonstrated how effectively the state could disrupt resistance through arrests and imprisonment.

The strongest judgement separates immediate results from continuing influence: resistance suffered severe organisational defeats in the early 1960s, but its political programme, exiled leadership and international profile survived.