Athenian Land and Naval Tactics and Equipment

Equipment and tactics worked together

In fifth-century BC Athens, warfare on land and at sea depended on different kinds of strength. Hoplites fought at close quarters in a protective formation, while warships used speed and manoeuvrability to attack enemy vessels. In both settings, equipment was effective only when men coordinated their movements.

A tactic is a method used during fighting, such as attacking an enemy's side. A formation is the arrangement of a force, such as soldiers standing in close ranks or ships forming a line.

The hoplite's weapons and protection

A hoplite was a heavily armed foot soldier. His principal weapon was a long spear, typically around 2.5 metres long, which allowed him to thrust at an opponent before coming within sword range. A short sword provided a weapon for closer fighting, including when the spear could no longer be used effectively.

The large, circular shield was carried on the left arm. It protected the soldier and contributed to the protection of the man beside him. A helmet protected the head, while a breastplate or corselet protected the torso and greaves protected the shins. Equipment varied: protection could include bronze body armour or lighter materials such as linen. There was no single identical outfit worn by every Athenian hoplite.

Protection came at a cost. Heavy equipment made rapid movement tiring, so hoplites were better suited to coordinated close fighting than to chasing mobile opponents over difficult ground.

The phalanx: strength through cohesion

Hoplites usually fought in a phalanx: a close formation with successive ranks of soldiers, commonly eight or more men deep. They advanced together, keeping their shields close and presenting a line of spears towards the enemy.

Imagine looking down on the front rank. Each man's shield is on his left, and it helps protect the exposed right side of the man immediately to his left. This creates mutual protection rather than a row of isolated fighters. The ranks behind help maintain the formation's depth and cohesion.

At contact, hoplites thrust with their spears; close fighting could follow as the opposing formations struggled to break one another's ranks. If soldiers fled or left gaps, the protection offered by the formation weakened. Maintaining the group was therefore more important than pursuing an enemy alone.

The phalanx was strongest against an opponent directly in front of it, especially on relatively level ground. Its flanks, or sides, and its rear were less well protected. Rough terrain could separate soldiers and open gaps. A wide front reduced the risk of being outflanked, but commanders also needed enough depth to keep the formation strong.

Hoplites played an important part in the Greek victory over Persia at Marathon in 490 BC, where Athens took a leading role. Their long spears and protective equipment were valuable in close fighting, but the phalanx was not equally effective in every situation.

Lighter troops offered different advantages

Not all land warfare consisted of hoplites meeting head-on. Archers, slingers and javelin throwers could attack from a distance. Peltasts were more lightly armed than hoplites and could harass an enemy with javelins before withdrawing. Such troops could exploit the difficulty heavily equipped soldiers faced when trying to catch them.

Athens also used cavalry. Mounted troops and lighter infantry could operate around a formation's flanks, making them useful complements to hoplites. The contrast was between the phalanx's protection and close-combat strength and the mobility of troops able to attack, retreat and change position more easily.

The trireme's equipment

A trireme was a warship with rowers arranged at three levels on each side. A typical Athenian trireme had about 170 rowers. Its light wooden construction and many oars made it fast and manoeuvrable, but this depended on coordinated rowing.

The ship's main weapon was a bronze-sheathed ram projecting from the bow, or front. It struck an enemy hull to damage or disable the vessel and could potentially sink it. Speed alone was not enough: the attacking ship also needed to approach at a useful angle.

At the stern, or rear, steering oars acted as rudders. They allowed the helmsman to direct the ship towards a target or away from danger. Hypozomata, strengthening cables associated with the hull, helped reinforce the ship and keep it stable under the stresses of ramming.

A sail was useful for travelling, but sails were taken down for battle. Oars gave crews more direct control over movement when approaching, turning or withdrawing. Small groups of hoplites and archers also served aboard Athenian triremes, allowing missile fire and boarding combat alongside ramming.

Naval formations created opportunities to ram

The safest target was not necessarily an enemy's bow, where its own ram threatened the attacker. Manoeuvres could instead put a trireme in a position to strike an enemy's side or rear.

In a diekplous, ships passed through gaps in the opposing line to get beyond its front and gain an attacking position. In a periplous, ships moved around the end of the enemy line to reach its side or rear. Both depended on speed, steering and coordinated crews.

A defending fleet could form a long front to make it harder for an enemy to go around its ends. Keeping ships sufficiently close together reduced the gaps available for a diekplous. Formation therefore mattered at sea as well as on land: it influenced where the enemy could move and which vessels were exposed.

At Salamis in 480 BC, Athens was a major contributor to the allied Greek fleet that defeated the invading Persian fleet of Xerxes. Triremes were not uniquely Athenian, however: other Greek states and the Persians also used them.

Conditions could limit each force

Triremes needed relatively calm water and had little room for food, water or sleeping accommodation. Operations were therefore often conducted close to land, and ships were commonly pulled ashore overnight. Their mobility in battle did not make them independent of coastal support.

The central comparison is between two forms of coordinated fighting. On land, hoplites relied on maintaining a protective formation. At sea, rowers and helmsmen worked together to create a favourable position for the ram. In both cases, an opponent could gain an advantage by disrupting that coordination or reaching an exposed side.