Ethical Perspectives on Human and Animal Life

Abortion is the deliberate ending of a pregnancy. Jewish discussions recognise the importance of developing human life, but do not simply give the foetus exactly the same status as its mother in every circumstance. The principle of pikuach nefesh, saving human life, helps explain why protecting the mother's life is central.

Mishnah Oholot 7.6 considers a woman in life-threatening difficulty during childbirth. It permits ending the life of the foetus because “her life comes before its life”. However, once most of the child has emerged, it must not be killed, because “one nefesh (person) is not to be put aside for another”.

The passage therefore establishes both a permission and a limit. Before that point, the mother's existing life takes priority when it is endangered. Once most of the baby has emerged, saving one person does not justify deliberately killing the other. This is not a general permission to end any unwanted pregnancy.

Why Jewish interpretations differ

Jewish authorities disagree about how widely the permission for abortion should extend. A stricter traditional approach, common in Orthodox Judaism, allows abortion when the foetus directly threatens the mother's life. Some authorities include exceptionally serious threats to mental health because these can themselves endanger life.

More permissive Jewish interpretations also consider grave harm to the mother's physical or psychological health, rather than requiring an immediate threat of death. Their reasoning is that the mother's health and the developing foetus are uniquely connected, and that serious maternal suffering deserves considerable weight.

A historical Reform rabbinic response, Abortion to Save Siblings from Suffering, illustrates this more permissive approach while setting clear boundaries. It explains that Reform responses have considered circumstances beyond a threat to the mother's life, but do not encourage abortion for trivial reasons or simply “on demand”. In the case discussed, anticipated hardship for other children was not sufficient grounds. Serious suffering affecting the mother could justify consideration, but concern about inconvenience or the possible burden on relatives did not automatically do so.

The contrast is therefore not simply ‘Orthodox against, Reform in favour’. Both approaches value developing life and recognise the importance of the mother. The disagreement concerns which threats or forms of suffering are serious enough to justify abortion. A reasoned judgement should address that threshold rather than treating either position as unrestricted.

Euthanasia, assisted dying and care at the end of life

Euthanasia means intentionally ending another person's life to relieve suffering. Assisted dying involves helping a person to end their own life. Neither should be confused with providing pain relief or good end-of-life care: relieving symptoms does not itself mean deliberately ending life.

Palliative care aims to relieve the symptoms and suffering associated with serious illness, rather than to cure the disease or end life. It offers an important alternative for people who oppose euthanasia but still believe that suffering should be relieved.

Jewish opposition to deliberately ending life

Orthodox Judaism opposes euthanasia because human life is sacred and belongs to God. Deliberately ending a person's life is understood to violate the commandment “You shall not murder”. A person's suffering does not remove their value or make their life disposable.

Ethics of the Fathers 4:22 teaches, “Perforce you were born, perforce you live and perforce you will die.” ‘Perforce’ means that these things happen beyond a person's own choice. Applied to euthanasia, the teaching supports the argument that individuals do not have unlimited authority over their own life and death: that authority belongs to God.

The account of Rabbi Hanina ben Teradyon gives a concrete example of this reasoning. While the Romans were burning him to death, his students urged him to hasten his death to end his agony. He refused, saying that it was better for the one who had given him his soul to take it than for him to do so himself. His response places God's authority above the wish to escape suffering.

This does not mean that Jewish opposition to euthanasia requires indifference to pain. Palliative care is widely supported in Judaism as a compassionate way to relieve suffering without deliberately ending life.

Allowing natural death: a more flexible Jewish approach

Some Reform Jews place greater emphasis on personal autonomy and dignity in decisions at the end of life. They may support withdrawing life support when death is imminent and the person is suffering. This is sometimes called passive euthanasia, but it is important to distinguish allowing natural death from deliberately administering something to cause death.

Such an approach does not mean that all Reform Jews support active euthanasia. It allows circumstances, the person's wishes and the burdens of treatment to carry greater weight, while still recognising the value of life.

The central question is whether protecting life always requires prolonging it. An opponent of euthanasia may argue that dignity belongs to every person, including those who are dependent or suffering, so care should protect rather than end their life. A more flexible response may argue that allowing an imminently dying person to die naturally can respect dignity without treating life as worthless. A justified judgement should distinguish the purpose of the intervention, its circumstances and whether suffering can be relieved through care.

Humanist arguments for personal choice

Many Humanists support a dying person's right to choose a medically assisted death. Their reasoning connects personal autonomy with compassion: someone facing a painful terminal illness should have a say in whether they continue to endure that suffering. Without belief that God determines when a person should die, they do not accept that this religious belief should govern everyone's choice.

This is not the view of every Humanist or every non-religious person. A commitment to wellbeing also raises questions about protecting vulnerable people and ensuring that a decision is genuinely free, rather than made under pressure.

What Dignity in Dying campaigns for

Dignity in Dying is a separate organisation supported by many Humanists, including the British Humanist Association. Its vision of a dignified death has three connected elements:

• Choice over where a person dies, who is present and their treatment options.
• Access to expert information, good end-of-life care and support for loved ones and carers.
• Control over symptoms, pain relief and planning for death.

Its campaign seeks a legally safeguarded option of medically assisted dying for terminally ill adults with mental capacity: the ability to understand and make the decision. Safeguards are important because supporters must explain not only why choice matters, but how vulnerable people would be protected.

Support is not confined to people without religion. Inter-Faith Leaders for Dignity in Dying supports the campaign, showing that religious commitment does not always lead to opposition. Equally, opposing assisted dying does not necessarily mean opposing compassion or pain relief.

One challenge to religious opposition asks why medicine may prolong life if only God should decide when death occurs. A possible reply distinguishes preserving and caring for life from deliberately ending it. The disagreement is then about the purpose and moral character of the intervention, not merely whether humans intervene at all.

A justified conclusion should weigh both relief of suffering and freedom of choice against the need to protect vulnerable people. It should explain whether safeguards answer the concern, rather than assuming that either autonomy or protection automatically settles the debate.

Does human life always matter more than animal life?

Some people give human life priority because of religious beliefs about humanity's special place in creation. Some non-religious people also give humans greater priority, but refer instead to human intellectual abilities. Others challenge the assumption that being human alone is enough to justify using animals for food, clothing or medical experiments.

Evolution provides relevant background: humans belong to the animal world rather than standing outside it. However, a scientific explanation of our origins does not, by itself, settle how we ought to treat other animals. That requires an ethical argument.

Peter Singer: suffering matters, not just species

The Humanist philosopher Peter Singer criticises speciesism: favouring humans simply because they belong to our own species. He compares this with other forms of prejudice because an individual's group membership is being used to discount their interests.

For Singer, the crucial consideration is sentience, the capacity to experience pain and pleasure. An animal's inability to speak like a human does not make its suffering unimportant. We should consider the wellbeing of all sentient creatures, not dismiss their pain merely because they are not human.

For example, when considering an animal experiment, Singer's approach asks us to weigh the animal's suffering rather than automatically treating a human benefit as decisive. Equal consideration of suffering does not mean that humans and animals have identical needs or must always receive identical treatment.

A defence of giving humans priority might point to the importance of saving human lives through medical research. Singer's challenge is whether that benefit is sufficient to justify the harm, rather than whether humans happen to be the beneficiaries. A strong evaluation therefore compares the seriousness of the interests involved and explains why one should outweigh the other.

• Mishnah Oholot 7.6: the mother's life takes priority in life-threatening childbirth; once most of the baby has emerged, one person must not be killed to save another.
• Stricter traditional interpretations: generally require a threat to the mother's life.
• More permissive interpretations: may also consider grave physical or psychological harm to the mother.
• Historical Reform response: serious maternal suffering can matter; trivial reasons or anticipated hardship for other relatives are not automatically sufficient.

Jewish attitudes towards euthanasia

• Orthodox opposition: sanctity of life, God's authority over death and “You shall not murder”.
• Ethics of the Fathers 4:22: “Perforce you were born, perforce you live and perforce you will die.” Life and death are not entirely ours to control.
• Some Reform Jews: may support withdrawing life support when death is imminent and the person is suffering, emphasising autonomy and dignity.
• Palliative care: widely supported; relieving suffering is distinct from deliberately ending life.

Assisted dying and Humanism

• Many Humanists support autonomy and relief from suffering; not all agree.
• Dignity in Dying: choice, access to care and information, and control over end-of-life decisions.
• Campaign focus: terminally ill adults with mental capacity, with safeguards protecting vulnerable people.
• It is a separate organisation, not exclusively Humanist or non-religious. Inter-Faith Leaders for Dignity in Dying also supports it.
• Evaluation: weigh free choice and compassion against vulnerability and pressure.

Human and animal life

• Human priority may be defended through religious special status or human intellectual abilities.
• Singer: species membership alone does not justify discounting an animal's interests.
• Sentience: suffering and pleasure matter morally.
• Equal consideration is not identical treatment. Evaluate the interests and harms involved, not merely which species benefits.