Impact of Resistance and the State Response

Resistance challenged obedience, not just individual policies

During the 1970s, resistance challenged the apartheid regime’s ability to keep black South Africans politically passive. Black Consciousness encouraged pride and self-assertion rather than acceptance of white domination. School and student organisations provided places where that confidence could become collective action.

The Soweto students’ demonstration on 16 June 1976 showed the importance of this change. Opposition to compulsory teaching in Afrikaans brought pupils into the streets; police violence then ignited wider grievances about education and apartheid. The government faced more than disagreement over a school rule: young people were openly defying its authority.

However, challenging authority was not the same as removing it. The regime retained the police, administrative machinery and power to ban organisations. Evaluating resistance therefore means asking both how seriously it challenged the government and how effectively the government contained it.

Labour resistance forced concessions

The Durban strikes of January and February 1973 exposed the dependence of businesses and public services on black workers. When municipal workers stopped work, rubbish accumulated and essential services were disrupted. Employers and the government could not simply assume that workers would accept low wages indefinitely.

Responses combined pressure with concessions. At the tea-packing firm T. W. Becket, police told strikers to return to work or face dismissal. Nevertheless, the company eventually agreed to a wage increase and reinstated most dismissed workers. Across the strike wave, many employers granted wage increases, although some workers lost their jobs.

The government’s explanations were divided. The Minister of Labour blamed agitators, while police reported that they had not detected organised agitation. The strikes had largely begun through workers’ own action rather than direction by an established union.

Their impact extended beyond immediate wage gains. Union organisation revived, and the state proved unable to stop its growth. The government appointed the Wiehahn Commission and implemented its recommendations allowing black trade unions to register legally. This was a significant concession: organised black labour could no longer simply be excluded from the industrial relations system. It did not, however, give black South Africans equal political rights or end apartheid.

The government attacked leadership and organisation

Repression aimed to prevent opponents from organising sustained campaigns. Restrictions on leading SASO figures in 1973 had already disrupted student organisation. After the Soweto uprising, the government intensified this approach. The Internal Security Amendment Act of 1976 widened its powers to detain suspects indefinitely without authorisation from a judge.

In April 1977, police arrested the entire executive committee of the Soweto Students Representative Council, including its president, Sechaba Montsitsi. Removing the leadership left the movement in disarray. Nevertheless, a new president, Trofomo Sono, called for a boycott of classes. Arrests could disrupt resistance without immediately ending it.

On 19 October 1977, the government declared 18 organisations unlawful, including SASO and other Black Consciousness organisations. Activists and journalists were detained, and The World and Weekend World newspapers were closed. These measures attacked both the people who coordinated opposition and the organisations and newspapers through which ideas circulated.

Biko’s death exposed the costs of repression

Steve Biko, a leading figure in Black Consciousness, was detained by security police on 18 August 1977. He suffered fatal brain injuries following assault in police custody. Despite his condition, he was transported from Port Elizabeth to Pretoria without adequate medical care. He died on 12 September 1977.

Justice and Police Minister Jimmy Kruger claimed that Biko had died following a hunger strike. Newspaper investigations challenged this explanation and reported his brain injuries and treatment in custody. The gap between the official claim and the circumstances of his death further damaged the government’s credibility.

Killing a prominent opponent did not silence his influence. Biko became a martyr: his death intensified black anger and renewed commitment to resistance. It also provoked international condemnation. Repression could remove a leader while making his cause more powerful.

Schools became instruments of political control

The government also targeted the settings in which resistance developed. On 1 September 1977, it announced that all Soweto secondary and high schools would become state schools. Between September and December, the schools were closed and year-end examinations were cancelled.

When schools reopened in 1978, pupils had to apply to a government district office, which allocated them to schools. Many feared that this would identify participants in the 1976 uprising who had escaped imprisonment. Thousands instead chose part-time study at adult education centres.

Prominent schools in the uprising, including Morris Isaacson and Orlando High School, could directly register pupils only for Standard 6 and Standard 9, equivalent to Grades 8 and 11. Other pupils had to be placed by the district office. This disrupted established school communities and gave the authorities greater control over admissions.

Control extended to staff appointments. Some teachers and headteachers resigned in protest when the schools became state schools. The education department took over appointing and placing teachers, reducing the opportunity for politically committed teachers to work with pupils. Repression therefore involved administrative control as well as police action.

Repression had substantial immediate effects

By removing leaders, dispersing pupils and controlling schools, the government weakened the networks needed for collective action. Police harassment forced hundreds of students into exile in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. Others moved to relatives in rural areas or sought employment, further breaking up student communities.

The Christmas consumer boycott illustrates the change. In 1976, township residents gave it overwhelming support. In 1977, support was weaker, although the boycott continued. Detention and exile had removed many leaders, while some residents had less appetite for confrontation.

Attempts to rebuild organisation also struggled. The Soweto Students League, formed in March 1978, made little impact, and its leadership was soon forced into hiding. At black universities, SASO’s banning and the imprisonment of leading members created a leadership vacuum. These were concrete successes for the regime in suppressing mobilisation.

Exile and international pressure widened the challenge

Repression also strengthened opposition beyond South Africa’s borders. After Soweto, many young people fled and joined the African National Congress (ANC) and its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), for military training. The state’s attempt to suppress internal resistance therefore supplied recruits to an organisation fighting it from exile.

The government continued to use severe punishment against ANC activity. Harry Gwala and other ANC members received life sentences in July 1977, and MK operative Solomon Mahlangu was executed in April 1979. Such measures demonstrated the state’s continuing coercive power, but did not prevent the ANC from recruiting or pursuing armed resistance.

International campaigning gained force from the violence at Soweto and Biko’s death. On 4 November 1977, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 418, imposing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. Unlike condemnation alone, this required member states to stop supplying arms. It restricted the regime’s access to foreign weapons and demonstrated its growing isolation, although apartheid remained intact.

International pressure could also have more immediate effects. Following an international campaign, The World editor Percy Qoboza and nine other detained leaders were released in March 1978. This was a specific concession, not a general abandonment of repression.

Containment was not the same as resolving opposition

Repression did not remove the grievances that had produced resistance. Teachers who resigned helped establish the Teachers Action Committee in 1978 and alternative educational initiatives. New student organisations also emerged, including the Congress of South African Students and the Azanian Students’ Organisation in 1979, although they initially struggled to build support.

Nor was the effect uniform across the country. Soweto remained relatively quiet from 1978 to 1983, but a major student uprising occurred in Bloemfontein in September 1978. Reduced activity in one centre cannot be treated as the disappearance of national opposition.

The strongest judgement is therefore qualified. Resistance challenged obedience, forced labour concessions and increased international pressure. Repression substantially weakened student organisation and helped the government survive the immediate crisis. Yet it also generated anger, encouraged recruitment into the ANC in exile and damaged South Africa’s international standing. The regime contained important forms of opposition without settling the underlying conflict over apartheid.