The Great Depression and Nazi Electoral Success (1929–1933)

Why an American crash became a German crisis

The Great Depression was a severe and prolonged economic downturn. Germany was particularly vulnerable because its recovery during the 1920s had depended heavily on American loans. These loans helped support German businesses and the wider economy, including the system of reparations payments following the First World War.

After the Wall Street Crash in October 1929, American lenders began recalling loans. German banks came under pressure and demanded repayment from businesses. Firms that could not obtain money to keep operating reduced production or closed. At the same time, falling demand abroad made German goods harder to sell.

The crisis became self-reinforcing. As businesses dismissed workers, households had less money to spend. Falling spending then reduced other businesses’ sales, leading to further closures and unemployment. By September 1931, 4.3 million German workers were unemployed; by January 1933, the figure had reached 6.1 million.

Different groups experienced different kinds of hardship

For unemployed workers, losing a job meant losing the income needed for food, rent and other necessities. Cuts to unemployment benefits made this hardship worse. Some unemployed people became homeless and lived in makeshift accommodation. Families faced insecurity as well as poverty: they could not know when a reliable income would return.

Workers who kept their jobs were not protected from the crisis. Employers cut wages, while increased taxation added pressure to household budgets. Lower earnings meant that employment did not necessarily provide the standard of living workers had enjoyed before 1929.

Business owners faced falling sales and difficulties obtaining credit. Small shopkeepers and other middle-class business owners could lose both their income and the business they had built. People who had savings or investments also faced losses, while unemployment could force them to use up what remained. This threatened the independence and security that many middle-class Germans valued.

Farmers already faced high debts, low agricultural prices and taxation. These problems made rural communities receptive to promises of help. Nazi organisers increasingly targeted farmers and other rural voters rather than concentrating only on urban workers.

Young people faced particularly limited opportunities to find work and establish independent lives. Nazi rallies and organisations presented the movement as energetic and forward-looking. For some, this offered a sense of belonging and purpose as well as the promise of a better future.

Hardship did not produce a single political response. Some Germans supported the Nazis, some turned to the Communists, and others remained loyal to established parties. The Nazis won some working-class support but never gained a majority of the working-class vote.

Economic hardship became a crisis of government

The Weimar Republic was Germany’s parliamentary democracy. Its governments usually depended on coalitions because several parties shared the seats in the Reichstag. The Depression placed these arrangements under intense pressure: parties disagreed over who should pay for support for the unemployed.

In March 1930, Chancellor Hermann Müller’s coalition resigned after disagreement over unemployment insurance. President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Heinrich Brüning as chancellor. Brüning’s government excluded the Social Democrats and lacked a parliamentary majority, making it difficult to pass policies through ordinary parliamentary votes.

Brüning pursued policies that cut spending and sought to reduce costs. These measures did little to relieve unemployment or poverty. Benefit cuts increased hardship, while the government’s apparent inability to improve conditions damaged confidence in it.

Hindenburg and Brüning increasingly used Article 48, the constitution’s emergency provision. The president could issue emergency measures without prior parliamentary approval, although parliament retained the right to demand their withdrawal. In July 1930, the Reichstag rejected an emergency budget decree. Hindenburg and Brüning responded by dissolving parliament and calling an election.

This began a period of presidential cabinets: governments dependent more on Hindenburg than on a parliamentary majority. Frequent emergency decrees and political deadlock made parliamentary government appear ineffective. The crisis was therefore economic, social and political at the same time.

Why the Nazis appeared attractive to more voters

The Depression weakened confidence in existing governments, but this alone does not explain why voters chose the Nazis. Nazi campaigning supplied a set of promises aimed at different anxieties.

Hitler promised national recovery, employment, strong leadership and the reversal of the Treaty of Versailles. To people who associated the republic with defeat, reparations or repeated crises, these promises could make Nazism appear a decisive alternative. Hitler presented himself as the leader who could overcome divisions and restore Germany’s strength.

Fear of communism also mattered. The KPD offered its own response to unemployment and poor living conditions, and its growing strength alarmed many property owners, middle-class voters and conservative politicians. Nazi anti-communism appealed to people who feared losing property or facing revolutionary change. Some business owners provided financial support for the Nazi movement.

The Nazis tailored their messages to their audiences. They appealed to workers through promises of employment and improved conditions, while addressing the concerns of farmers, small business owners and other middle-class voters. This helped them reach beyond one social group. Such campaigning could unite people around dissatisfaction without providing a consistent or convincing solution to every problem.

Antisemitism remained central to Nazism. Nazi propaganda falsely blamed Jewish people for Germany’s problems. Although some campaigning downplayed the most extreme antisemitic policies to broaden the party’s appeal, Nazi newspapers continued spreading antisemitic conspiracy theories, and Nazi activists attacked Jewish people and businesses. These were hateful claims and acts, not explanations of the economic crisis.

Organisation and propaganda turned opportunities into votes

The Nazis entered the Depression with a nationwide party organisation that could run local campaigns. Their existing network mattered because hardship alone could not distribute posters, arrange meetings or persuade voters.

Joseph Goebbels coordinated propaganda using posters, marches, rallies and campaign events. In the month before the September 1930 election, the Nazis held tens of thousands of events across Germany. Hitler addressed large audiences, presenting both himself and the movement as powerful alternatives to a weak government.

In 1932, the Nazis used sound recordings, sound films and air travel to extend their campaigning. Flying between cities allowed Hitler to speak to several large crowds in a day and attracted publicity. These methods created an impression of energy, modernity and growing momentum.

The electoral breakthrough was substantial. In May 1928, the Nazis had won only 2.6% of the Reichstag vote. In September 1930, they won about 18% and became the second-largest party. Hitler also challenged Hindenburg in the 1932 presidential election: he lost, but increased his support from about 30% in March to just under 37% in the April run-off. Presidential and parliamentary elections were separate contests, but both demonstrated his growing prominence.

In the 31 July 1932 Reichstag election, the Nazis won 37.3% of the vote and 230 seats, becoming the largest party. This did not give them a majority: 230 seats out of 608 was well short of more than half. Hitler demanded the chancellorship, but Hindenburg refused. Electoral success made Hitler influential without automatically putting him in charge of government.

Support did not rise continuously. In the 6 November 1932 election, the Nazi vote fell to 33.1%, and their seats fell to 196, a loss of 34. They remained the largest party, while the KPD increased its representation to 100 seats. The November result shows both the limits of Nazi appeal and the continuing strength of extremist opposition to the existing political system.

Violence deepened the disorder the Nazis promised to end

The SA protected Nazi meetings, disrupted opponents’ meetings and fought political opponents, particularly Communists. Nazi deputies also obstructed parliamentary business and refused to support Brüning’s measures.

This created a contradiction: the Nazis helped destabilise Germany while claiming that only they could restore order. Street violence and the authorities’ failure to control it further weakened confidence in the republic. Jewish people faced antisemitic abuse and attacks as well as the wider economic crisis.

Violence should not be treated simply as a persuasive campaign method. It intimidated opponents and damaged public life, but it also frightened or repelled people. Nazi electoral support cannot be explained by intimidation alone.

How political negotiations brought Hitler into office

The final step depended on decisions by politicians who controlled access to government. Hindenburg dismissed Brüning in May 1932 and appointed Franz von Papen, who took office in June. Papen had little parliamentary support. To secure Nazi cooperation, his government lifted the ban on the SA and called the July election. These decisions gave the Nazis further opportunities to campaign and increased the scope for street violence.

Papen could not establish a workable government. Kurt von Schleicher replaced him as chancellor on 3 December 1932. Schleicher tried to weaken Hitler by drawing part of the Nazi movement, led by Gregor Strasser, into cooperation with his government. Hitler resisted this attempt, and it failed. Schleicher also failed to secure the support needed to keep his government in office.

Meanwhile, Papen sought a return to power through an agreement with Hitler. They met at banker Kurt von Schröder’s house in Cologne on 4 January 1933, and negotiations continued over the following weeks. Papen and other conservatives wanted the Nazis’ mass support for a government pursuing their own authoritarian aims. They believed that surrounding Hitler with conservative ministers, with Papen as vice-chancellor, would allow them to control him.

Hindenburg eventually accepted this arrangement and appointed Hitler chancellor on 30 January 1933. Hitler’s appointment therefore followed a decline in the Nazi vote, not a new electoral victory. The president’s decision and the conservatives’ miscalculation converted Nazi popularity into government office. Appointment as chancellor was not yet the same as establishing the dictatorship that followed.

Weighing the reasons for Nazi success

The Depression was a crucial turning point because it transformed the conditions in which the Nazis competed. Their radical message had attracted relatively few voters during the more stable late 1920s. Mass unemployment and ineffective government made more people willing to consider an extreme alternative.

However, the Depression did not make Nazi success inevitable. Party organisation, targeted promises, Hitler’s public image, propaganda and fear of communism helped the Nazis turn discontent into support. Their electoral decline in November 1932 demonstrates that this support had limits.

Different factors explain different stages of the rise. The economic crisis created the opportunity; Nazi campaigning helped build a mass following; presidential government weakened reliance on parliamentary majorities; and negotiations involving Papen and Hindenburg brought Hitler into office. Electoral popularity made Hitler useful to conservative politicians, but their choices explain why he became chancellor when he did.

Depression: the chain of effects

• October 1929: Wall Street Crash; American loans recalled.
• German banks and businesses came under pressure; exports and production fell.
• Job losses reduced spending, causing further business failures.
• Unemployment: 4.3 million, September 1931 → 6.1 million, January 1933.

Different experiences

• Unemployed: lost income, benefit cuts, poverty and homelessness.
• Employed workers: wage cuts and higher taxes.
• Business owners and middle classes: falling sales, credit difficulties and threatened savings or independence.
• Farmers: debts, low prices and taxation.
• Young people: limited employment prospects.

Political crisis

• March 1930: Müller’s coalition resigned over unemployment insurance.
• Brüning lacked a parliamentary majority; his policies failed to relieve hardship.
• Hindenburg increasingly used Article 48; presidential cabinets displaced normal parliamentary government.
• Nazi obstruction and street violence intensified instability.

Reasons for rising Nazi support

• Discontent: unemployment and loss of confidence in Weimar governments.
• Promises: jobs, strong leadership, national revival and reversal of Versailles.
• Fear of communism: appeal to property owners and conservatives.
• Campaigning: nationwide organisation, targeted messages, Goebbels’s propaganda and Hitler’s speeches.
• Violence: intimidation and disruption, alongside Nazi claims to offer order.

Electoral turning points

• May 1928: 2.6% of the Reichstag vote.
• September 1930: about 18%; second-largest party.
• 31 July 1932: 37.3%, 230 seats; largest party, not a majority.
• 6 November 1932: 33.1%, 196 seats; support fell, but the Nazis remained the largest party.
• Hitler lost the separate presidential election to Hindenburg in April 1932.

From popularity to appointment

• June 1932: Papen became chancellor; lifted the SA ban and called elections.
• 3 December 1932: Schleicher became chancellor; his attempt to split the Nazis failed.
• 4 January 1933: Papen met Hitler; conservatives negotiated a government they believed they could control.
• 30 January 1933: Hindenburg appointed Hitler chancellor; Papen became vice-chancellor.

The Depression opened opportunities and Nazi campaigning exploited them. Conservative negotiations converted mass support into office: appointment was neither an electoral majority nor yet the consolidation of dictatorship.