Communist Policy in Tibet & the Dazhai Case Study

Tibet: religious authority meets Communist control

Communist rule affected more than people’s political opinions. In Tibet it challenged a society in which Tibetan Buddhism was closely connected to government and everyday life. The Dalai Lama exercised both spiritual and political authority, while monasteries were important religious institutions and landowners. Attacking their power therefore changed both who governed Tibet and how people practised their religion.

Tibet had been effectively self-governing after the fall of China’s Qing dynasty in 1912, although successive Chinese governments continued to claim it as Chinese territory. The Communist government inherited that claim when it came to power in 1949.

In October 1950, the Chinese army invaded Tibet and defeated Tibetan resistance. A 1951 agreement recognised Chinese sovereignty while promising that Tibet would remain self-governing under the Dalai Lama. This distinction matters: Chinese sovereignty meant Tibet belonged to the Chinese state, whereas Tibetan autonomy meant retaining control over its internal affairs.

During much of the 1950s, the Chinese government officially worked through the Dalai Lama’s government. However, it also trained Tibetan Communist officials, organised serfs and promoted anti-religious propaganda. These measures challenged the traditional religious and social hierarchy and helped build Communist authority alongside the existing government.

The 1959 uprising and the loss of autonomy

Resentment of Chinese occupation and growing interference produced resistance. In 1959, fears that the Chinese authorities intended to remove or harm the Dalai Lama helped trigger an uprising in Lhasa, Tibet’s capital.

Chinese forces crushed the rebellion. Thousands of Tibetans were killed, and thousands more fled to neighbouring countries. The Dalai Lama escaped to India, where a Tibetan government-in-exile developed. His departure removed Tibet’s leading religious and political figure from the territory, although he continued to represent Tibetan opposition from abroad.

The Chinese government ended Tibet’s remaining autonomy, imposed martial law and intensified political and religious persecution. This was a turning point: the earlier arrangement of working through the Dalai Lama’s government gave way to much more direct control.

Repression could also reach senior religious leaders who remained in Tibet. The Panchen Lama, another leading figure in Tibetan Buddhism, was arrested in 1964 and imprisoned for fourteen years. His treatment showed that religious status offered no protection against Communist political authority.

The Cultural Revolution in Tibet, 1966–1976

The Cultural Revolution intensified attacks on Tibetan religion and culture. Monasteries were closed, monks and nuns were forced to return to lay life, and Buddhist clergy and landlords faced struggle sessions. These were public denunciations intended to humiliate people and force them to submit to revolutionary authority.

Red Guards, including both Chinese and Tibetan activists, destroyed much of Tibet’s cultural heritage. The impact went beyond damage to buildings. Closing monasteries disrupted religious teaching and worship; forcing monks and nuns out of religious life weakened the communities that maintained Buddhist traditions. Public denunciation made religious authority a source of danger rather than respect.

However, repression did not begin in 1966. Destruction of monasteries had already begun in Amdo and Kham in 1958, and in Central Tibet from 1959, intensifying from 1962. The Cultural Revolution continued and deepened an assault already under way. It would therefore be misleading to attribute every destroyed Tibetan monastery to 1966–1976 alone.

Overall, Communist rule brought Tibet under much tighter Chinese state control while severely damaging religious institutions and cultural life. The suppression of resistance, the exile of the Dalai Lama and attacks on Buddhist communities show how political control and cultural repression reinforced each other.

Dazhai: a village turned into a national model

Dazhai was a farming community in Xiyang County, Shanxi province. In 1964, Mao made it a national model with the slogan ‘In agriculture, learn from Dazhai’. Although this began before the Cultural Revolution, the campaign became an important means of directing rural life during 1966–1976.

The Party presented Dazhai as proof that collective labour, political commitment and self-reliance could overcome difficult natural conditions. Villagers transformed infertile land by clearing mountainsides, building terraced fields and bringing water over long distances for irrigation. Terraces created usable fields on slopes, while irrigation supplied water for crops.

The leading organiser was Chen Yonggui, a local Party activist associated with poor and lower-middle peasants. He organised labour teams with names such as the ‘Iron Girls’ and ‘Oldsters and Youngsters’. Their backbreaking work helped make Dazhai a symbol of what the Party wanted other rural communities to achieve.

Why an agricultural example became a political demand

Dazhai was not promoted simply as useful farming advice. Its advertised success supported a political message: peasants should work collectively and put collective goals before private gain. Collectivisation meant organising land, labour and production in shared units rather than allowing families to farm independently.

By the early 1970s, Dazhai had become a benchmark for agricultural production. Communities were expected to follow it even when their local conditions were different. This could have disastrous consequences, particularly in areas with abundant water resources where copying Dazhai’s approach was unsuitable.

The campaign therefore shows how political conformity could take priority over practical judgement. A model developed for one community became a national expectation, limiting the freedom of other communities to choose methods suited to their own land.

Enforcing the model through repression

Repression means using intimidation, punishment or restrictions to control people and prevent opposition. The national campaign to learn from Dazhai linked agricultural organisation to this kind of political control.

During the early disorder of the Cultural Revolution, some villagers expanded private plots, sold produce in markets or pursued other independent work. These activities gave households more control over their livelihoods. From 1968, revolutionary committees strengthened control over the countryside, and radical interpretations of the Dazhai campaign pushed communities back towards tighter collectivisation.

Some local cadres abolished private plots and even slaughtered privately owned animals. In Zhejiang, a quarter of production teams transferred responsibility for accounting to the larger production brigade. This meant villagers lost control over how income was distributed. In Gansu, more than 77,000 hectares of private plots were returned to collective control, roughly a third of private holdings.

These were consequences of imposing the Dazhai model across the countryside, not a description of identical events within Dazhai village. They show how the campaign could reduce peasants’ economic independence.

Turning ordinary economic activity into a political offence

Revolutionary committees enforced the model through the ‘three antis’ campaign, directed against graft, speculation and waste. Graft meant corrupt use of authority for personal gain; speculation included trading for private profit. In practice, the campaign also targeted ordinary people who had enlarged private plots or bought vegetables on the black market.

People could be accused of ‘following the capitalist road’ for trying to improve their livelihoods outside collective arrangements. In Hubei, 447,000 of the 736,000 people harassed by the authorities between February 1970 and October 1971 were classified as such ‘capitalist roaders’.

Punishments varied. Many people received reprimands or spells in re-education camps; the campaigns were not mainly about executing their targets. Their wider purpose was intimidation. If everyday actions could become political offences, people had strong reasons to obey officials and avoid independent activity.

Limits of control and the gap between image and reality

Enforcement was not uniform. Some cadres imposed strict collectivisation, while others tolerated private initiatives. Zhou Enlai encouraged a less extreme approach from 1970, and on 26 December 1971 the People’s Daily warned against ‘blindly learning from Dazhai’. The campaign continued, but its interpretation could change.

Dazhai’s public image also concealed important assistance. When the model was officially discredited in late 1980, it emerged that its achievements had depended on extensive help from the People’s Liberation Army and the use of heavy machinery. This contradicted its promotion as a triumph of unaided manpower and political commitment.

Dazhai therefore illustrates the relationship between propaganda and repression: an idealised success story justified demands for conformity, while restrictions and political accusations helped enforce those demands. However, changing policies and local resistance meant that the Party never secured completely uniform control.

Tibet: control and resistance

• 1950: Chinese army invaded Tibet.
• 1951: agreement recognised Chinese sovereignty but promised self-government under the Dalai Lama.
• 1959: uprising crushed; thousands killed or fled; Dalai Lama escaped to India. Remaining Tibetan autonomy ended and persecution intensified.
• 1964: Panchen Lama arrested and imprisoned for fourteen years.

Tibet during the Cultural Revolution

• Monasteries closed; monks and nuns forced into lay life.
• Clergy and landlords subjected to struggle sessions.
• Chinese and Tibetan Red Guards destroyed cultural heritage.
• Consequences: weakened religious institutions, disrupted Buddhist traditions and strengthened political control.
• Qualification: monastery destruction and religious repression began before 1966.

Dazhai: essential facts

• Location: Xiyang County, Shanxi province.
• Leader: Chen Yonggui; labour teams included the ‘Iron Girls’.
• 1964: Mao’s slogan, ‘In agriculture, learn from Dazhai’.
• Advertised achievements: terracing, irrigation and transforming infertile land through collective effort and self-reliance.

How the campaign became repressive

• Communities were expected to copy Dazhai regardless of local conditions.
• Some cadres abolished private plots and restricted private economic activity.
• In Zhejiang, a quarter of production teams transferred accounting to brigades, reducing villagers’ control over income distribution.
• The ‘three antis’ campaign targeted supposed ‘capitalist roaders’, including ordinary villagers pursuing private economic activity.
• Political accusations, reprimands and re-education intimidated people into conformity.

Qualifications and judgement

• Enforcement varied between places; some cadres tolerated private activity.
• 1971: the People’s Daily warned against blindly copying Dazhai.
• Late 1980: the model was discredited; PLA assistance and machinery undermined its advertised self-reliance.
• Overall: propaganda justified collective discipline, while repression restricted peasants’ independence.