Appeasement and the Outbreak of World War II

Why Britain and France tried appeasement

Appeasement meant making concessions to another country’s demands in the hope of avoiding war. During the 1930s, Britain and France used this approach towards Hitler’s Germany. Neville Chamberlain, British prime minister from 1937, became closely associated with it, although concessions to Hitler had begun before he took office.

The experience of the First World War made another European war deeply frightening. Chamberlain believed that negotiation could prevent a repetition of its destruction. Public opinion strongly favoured peace, giving politicians another reason to avoid conflict. Many people also thought that the Treaty of Versailles had treated Germany too harshly. Allowing some changes to the settlement could therefore seem fair as well as practical.

Military and economic constraints also mattered. Britain was not ready for another major war, while the Depression made expensive rearmament difficult for both Britain and France. Postponing conflict could give them time to strengthen their armed forces. Appeasement and rearmament were therefore not necessarily alternatives: negotiation could be used while preparing stronger defences.

Britain also had worldwide imperial commitments. Its leaders feared the combined threats of Germany, Italy and Japan and doubted Britain’s ability to fight all three. They were uncertain whether the self-governing dominions would support another war, and worried that conflict could weaken British control over its colonies. Avoiding a European war seemed a way to protect the empire as well as Britain itself.

Fear of communism influenced some western politicians too. They regarded the communist USSR as a greater danger than Nazi Germany and hoped that a strong, anti-communist Germany would help contain it. This made cooperation with Stalin against Hitler less attractive to them.

Appeasement depended on an important assumption: once Germany’s reasonable grievances had been addressed, Hitler would stop making demands. The difficulty was that his ambitions extended beyond revising Versailles. He wanted to unite German-speaking people, destroy communism and gain Lebensraum, or ‘living space’, in eastern Europe. Concessions might satisfy a limited demand, but they could not necessarily satisfy an expansionist programme.

Earlier concessions encouraged greater risks

Hitler announced rearmament and conscription in March 1935, breaking the restrictions imposed by Versailles. Conscription meant compulsory military service, allowing Germany to build a larger army. Britain and France did not take military action to stop him.

In March 1936, German troops entered the Rhineland, where the peace settlement prohibited German troops and military defences. This was a gamble: Hitler had ordered his commanders to withdraw if they encountered opposition. Britain and France again did not intervene. Their response encouraged Hitler to believe that further treaty-breaking would go unpunished.

In March 1938, Hitler achieved the Anschluss, the union of Austria and Germany, which Versailles had forbidden. He used pressure and threats against the Austrian government before German troops entered Austria. Britain and France protested but did not stop the union. To supporters of appeasement, uniting German-speaking populations could appear to be a reasonable revision of the peace settlement. To Hitler, the lack of resistance was another reason to take greater risks.

The Sudeten crisis and Munich, 1938

Hitler next demanded the Sudetenland, a border region of Czechoslovakia containing around three million German-speaking people. He claimed that he was protecting them from persecution. However, the region also contained important industry, arms factories and defences. Taking it would strengthen Germany and weaken Czechoslovakia.

Chamberlain met Hitler three times in September 1938 in an effort to prevent war. At Berchtesgaden on 15 September, he agreed to discuss transferring areas with a German-speaking majority. At Godesberg on 22 September, Hitler increased his demands and threatened war. This showed how accepting one demand could lead to another rather than a lasting settlement.

At the Munich Conference on 29–30 September, Chamberlain, Hitler, the French leader Édouard Daladier and Italy’s Benito Mussolini agreed that Germany could take the Sudetenland. Hitler renounced claims to the rest of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia’s leader, Edvard Beneš, was not invited: the country’s future was decided without its participation.

On 30 September, Chamberlain and Hitler signed a separate Anglo-German declaration promising to settle disputes through discussion. Chamberlain returned to cheering crowds and announced ‘peace for our time’. For people who feared an imminent war, this was a genuine relief.

However, preventing war that September was not the same as securing lasting peace. Czechoslovakia lost important resources and defences, while Hitler gained territory without fighting Britain or France. Winston Churchill condemned Munich as a ‘total and unmitigated defeat’. His criticism highlighted the danger that concessions were strengthening the aggressor rather than restraining him.

March 1939 exposed the limits of appeasement

In March 1939, German forces occupied Czech lands beyond the Sudetenland, including Prague. This broke Hitler’s assurances at Munich and could not be explained simply as bringing German-speaking people into Germany. It demonstrated that his territorial ambitions went beyond the grievances used to justify earlier concessions.

Britain and France now concluded that appeasement had failed. They accelerated rearmament and promised to protect Poland. This marked a change from accepting territorial concessions towards warning Hitler that further aggression could bring war.

Appeasement can therefore be evaluated in two ways. Its supporters had understandable reasons for seeking negotiation: fear of another war, limited military readiness and the belief that some German grievances were legitimate. It avoided an immediate war at Munich and allowed more time for British and French rearmament. However, Germany also gained time to rearm, as well as territory and resources. Buying time did not benefit only the countries seeking peace.

Most importantly, appeasement’s central expectation proved mistaken. Hitler did not stop, and the concessions strengthened Germany while encouraging his confidence that Britain and France would continue to give way. This explains why the policy could seem reasonable at the time yet still have dangerous consequences.

The Nazi–Soviet Pact removed an obstacle to invasion

After Czechoslovakia, Hitler turned towards Poland. He wanted the Polish Corridor, which gave Poland access to the Baltic Sea and separated parts of German territory. His wider ambition for expansion eastwards also threatened Poland.

An invasion carried a risk for Hitler: Germany might face Britain and France in the west and the USSR in the east. Fighting on two fronts would divide German forces. Despite their ideological hostility, Hitler and Stalin reached the Nazi–Soviet Pact on 23 August 1939.

Publicly, Germany and the USSR agreed not to attack one another for ten years. Secretly, they agreed to divide Poland between them. Hitler gained greater confidence that the USSR would not oppose his invasion. He also hoped that, without the USSR as a potential ally, Britain and France would back down again. The pact did not mean that he had abandoned his longer-term ambitions against the Soviet Union.

Stalin had different reasons for making the agreement. He distrusted Britain and France: the USSR had been excluded from Munich, and he suspected that western concessions were encouraging Hitler to expand eastwards towards Soviet territory. Talks with Britain and France during the summer of 1939 failed to produce an alliance, reinforcing his doubts about their willingness to cooperate.

Stalin also wanted time to prepare for war. His purges of army officers in 1937–38 had weakened the Soviet military, so a non-aggression agreement offered time to rebuild it. The secret agreement promised territorial gains, including eastern Poland, which Stalin saw as a buffer against attack. These were his aims, not a guarantee that the pact would provide lasting security.

The agreement was therefore a practical bargain between enemies, not evidence that Nazism and communism had become compatible. Hitler sought freedom to attack Poland; Stalin sought territory and time while avoiding immediate war with Germany.

Why war broke out in September 1939

Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. Britain and France had promised to protect Poland and demanded that German troops withdraw. Hitler did not comply, and both countries declared war on Germany on 3 September.

Several causes connected to produce this outcome. Hitler’s expansionist aims created the drive towards conquest; rearmament gave him greater means to pursue it; repeated concessions encouraged further risks; and the Nazi–Soviet Pact reduced the danger of immediate Soviet opposition. The invasion of Poland was the immediate trigger, while Britain and France’s decision to honour their commitment turned it into a wider European war.

Appeasement was therefore an important contributing cause, but not the only one. It failed to restrain Hitler and helped him become stronger. The decision to invade Poland, however, was Hitler’s, and the outbreak of the wider war also depended on Britain and France finally refusing to accept another conquest.

Appeasement: the central judgement

• Reasons: fear of another First World War; belief that Versailles was too harsh; military unpreparedness and economic constraints; imperial commitments; some politicians’ fear of communism.
• Limited benefits: Munich avoided immediate war in September 1938; delay allowed time for British and French rearmament.
• Failure: Germany also rearmed. Concessions strengthened it, weakened Czechoslovakia and encouraged Hitler to take further risks.
• Failed assumption: satisfying German grievances would end Hitler’s demands.

Turning points

• March 1936: Rhineland remilitarised; no British or French military intervention.
• March 1938: Anschluss; Britain and France protested but did not stop it.
• 29–30 September 1938: Munich allowed Germany to take the Sudetenland; Czechoslovakia was excluded.