Jewish Conviction, Law and Religious Expression

However, a law restricting a religious practice can create a harder choice. Respect for civil authority and commitment to religious duty may pull in different directions. Seeking legal change offers a way of challenging a restriction without simply disregarding the law.

A concrete conflict: circumcision in Germany in 2012

Brit milah, circumcision, marks the covenant between God and the Jewish people. Genesis 17:10–14 establishes circumcision as a covenant requirement. It normally takes place on a boy’s eighth day of life, although exceptional circumstances can delay it. For observant Jewish parents, this is therefore a religious responsibility, not merely a family custom.

In May 2012, a court in Cologne, Germany, ruled that the circumcision of a child constituted unlawful bodily injury despite parental consent and religious motivation. The case concerned a Muslim boy, but its implications also affected Jewish families practising brit milah. The court stressed the permanent change to the child’s body and his interest in being able to decide for himself later.

The conflict involved several competing responsibilities. Jewish parents could argue that religious freedom includes bringing up their children within their faith and fulfilling the covenant. Supporters of restrictions could argue that the state must protect children’s bodily integrity and future freedom of choice, since a young child cannot give informed consent. This concern can also support a non-religious argument for restriction; it need not involve hostility towards Judaism.

On 19 July 2012, the German parliament resolved that Jewish and Muslim religious life should remain viable in Germany. In December 2012, legislation permitted religious circumcision under conditions, including provision for appropriately trained practitioners. The legal position therefore changed: the court ruling did not become a permanent nationwide ban.

This example shows why a justified conclusion must consider both religious freedom and children’s rights. Supporting religious freedom does not remove the need for safeguards; supporting child protection does not remove the need to consider the consequences for religious communities.

What freedom of religious expression protects

Freedom of religious expression concerns the outward practice of belief. For Jewish people, this can include wearing religious clothing, worshipping in a synagogue and observing religious customs. Freedom matters because a person may be unable to fulfil a religious duty if they are allowed to believe privately but forbidden to act on that belief publicly.

Protecting Jewish religious expression also raises a wider question of equality: should the same freedom extend to other religions and to people with no religion? A consistent defence of freedom protects choices beyond one’s own community. It does not require agreeing that every belief is true.

Freedom can nevertheless come into conflict with other rights. The circumcision debate demonstrates that protecting religious practice and protecting an individual’s bodily integrity may lead to different conclusions. The important question is whether a restriction responds to a specific harm and goes no further than necessary, rather than simply suppressing an unfamiliar religion.

Censorship: protection or suppression?

Censorship occurs when an authority controls what people can communicate or access. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises freedom of opinion and expression. Restrictions may protect people, but they can also prevent disagreement and conceal wrongdoing.

Jewish tradition contains support for diversity of opinion. The Talmud, Berakhot 58a, recognises that people’s thoughts differ just as their appearances differ. Rabbinic discussions also preserve minority opinions even when the law follows the majority. Rabbi Marc D. Angel draws on these traditions to argue that responsible, respectful disagreement is a legitimate and necessary part of Jewish religious life. Suppressing every unpopular opinion could prevent people from discovering errors or reaching a better understanding of their faith.

There are also Jewish arguments for boundaries. Rabbi Moshe Hagiz opposed challenges to rabbinic teachings because he feared that these would undermine rabbinic authority and, ultimately, religious belief and observance. Angel himself defends disagreement within the boundaries of accepted Jewish faith and supported by authoritative teachings, rather than unlimited freedom from religious authority. The disagreement is therefore partly about where legitimate questioning ends and damaging rejection of tradition begins.

These are debates about authority within a religious community, not automatic instructions for government censorship. Nevertheless, they help explain contrasting Jewish approaches: one emphasises protecting tradition, while another stresses that respectful criticism can strengthen it.

In public life, an argument for restricting material encouraging attacks on Jews focuses on protecting people’s safety and ability to practise their religion. An argument against broad censorship focuses on the danger to minorities: powers used to silence unpopular views could also silence Jewish teaching or criticism of unfair treatment. Disagreement with a belief is different from threatening its followers. Someone can therefore support restrictions on incitement to violence while defending peaceful criticism of Judaism.

Religious extremism and the dangers of certainty

Religious extremism is not simply taking religion seriously. The concern is with ideas or actions that deny others’ rights or promote hatred, coercion or violence in religion’s name. Strict observance of religious practices is not, by itself, extremism.

Rabbi Naftali Tsevi Yehudah Berlin, known as the Netsiv, warned about people treating anyone who worshipped differently from themselves as a heretic. He feared that self-righteous attempts to discredit and pursue others would destroy the community. His warning challenges the claim that certainty about one’s own interpretation justifies suppressing other believers.

Jewish interpretation also wrestles with difficult accounts of religious zeal. In Numbers 25, Pinchas kills an Israelite man and a Midianite woman and is subsequently granted a ‘covenant of peace’. A Hasidic interpretation praises his willingness to take responsibility when established leaders were slow to act. This reading values decisive commitment to God.

However, Jewish commentator John Schecter questions the attraction of resolving difficult problems through violence. He argues that praising Pinchas for acting quickly assumes that the leaders were wrong to act slowly. The contrast shows why a biblical account of zeal cannot simply be treated as permission for modern believers to use violence whenever they feel their religion is threatened.

An extremist may claim that religious duty justifies overriding the law or imposing beliefs on others. Dina de-malkhuta dina provides a reason to reject the assumption that religious conviction automatically excuses unlawful conduct. The Netsiv’s warning adds another reason: treating one interpretation as grounds for persecuting others can damage the very religious community it claims to defend.

A justified conclusion can therefore defend peaceful worship and responsible religious debate while supporting targeted restrictions on threats and incitement. This balance protects people’s rights without making beliefs immune from criticism or treating an entire religious community as responsible for extremist behaviour.

• Brit milah: covenant duty; Genesis 17:10–14; normally the eighth day.
• May: Cologne court ruled child circumcision unlawful bodily injury despite parental consent and religious motivation.
• Competing rights: parental religious freedom versus the child’s bodily integrity and future choice.
• 19 July: parliament supported continued Jewish and Muslim religious life.
• December: legislation permitted circumcision under conditions.

Expression and censorship

• Religious expression includes public worship, clothing and religious practices.
• Berakhot 58a: people’s thoughts differ; Jewish tradition preserves minority opinions.
• Rabbi Angel: responsible, respectful disagreement supports religious understanding.
• Rabbi Hagiz: challenges to rabbinic teachings risk undermining authority and observance.
• Internal religious boundaries are not automatically grounds for state censorship.
• Balance protection from threats and incitement against freedom of debate and minority expression.

Extremism

• Serious religious commitment is not necessarily extremism.
• Netsiv: condemning differing believers as heretics can lead to persecution and destroy community life.
• Pinchas, Numbers 25: a Hasidic reading praises decisive responsibility; Schecter questions the appeal of violent solutions.
• Defensible conclusion: protect peaceful expression and disagreement; justify targeted restrictions by the harm they prevent.