Changes in Industry

Security was a powerful motive. The war scare of 1927 increased Stalin's fear of invasion by capitalist countries. A modern army needed weapons manufactured in large quantities. Expanding coal, steel and electricity production would provide the materials and energy needed for armaments. Industrial development therefore served a military purpose as well as an economic one.

Stalin also believed industrialisation would advance communism. Marxist theory associated the development of communism with an advanced industrial society and a large working class. Building factories and drawing workers into towns would help create that society. Presenting himself as the leader continuing Lenin's work also strengthened Stalin's reputation.

Why the NEP no longer satisfied Stalin

The New Economic Policy, or NEP, introduced by Lenin in 1921, allowed limited private enterprise and market trading. Peasants could sell their produce rather than surrendering it through grain requisitioning, and small businesses could operate privately. However, the state retained control of heavy industry and large businesses. The NEP was therefore not a completely free-market economy.

By the late 1920s, its recovery appeared to have stalled: unemployment was increasing, and some areas of production had still not reached their pre-war level of 1913. Grain exports were also insufficient to earn the foreign currency needed to finance industrial development. Stalin wanted a much faster transformation than the NEP appeared able to deliver.

There were ideological objections too. Private profits and the enrichment of some business owners seemed to many communists to contradict their principles.

Changing policy also offered political advantages. Stalin had previously supported the NEP, but abandoning it allowed him to attack opponents on the right of the Communist Party, including Bukharin, who continued to support it. Central planning would also give Moscow greater control over economic activity throughout the country. Industrialisation was therefore connected to both Stalin's leadership struggle and the growth of his authority.

How central planning worked

The Five-Year Plans organised industrial development through a command economy. Instead of factories independently deciding what to produce, the state established priorities and production targets for a five-year period.

The Communist Party set overall objectives for the USSR. Gosplan, the State Committee for Planning, translated these objectives into targets for particular industries and regions. Regional authorities then allocated targets to factories, mines and workshops. Within each workplace, targets passed through foremen to individual workers.

This chain connected a national ambition, such as increasing coal production, to the amount expected from a particular mine and its workers. It enabled the state to concentrate resources on its chosen priorities. However, setting a target did not guarantee that the materials, transport or skilled workers needed to achieve it would be available.

The First Five-Year Plan, 1928–32

The First Plan concentrated on heavy industry, especially coal, iron, steel and electricity. These industries supplied the fuel, materials and power needed to expand factory production. Consumer goods received little attention.

New industrial centres demonstrated the scale of Stalin's ambitions. Construction of Magnitogorsk, a steel-producing city in the Urals, began in 1929, and its first blast furnace was operating by 1932. Foreign engineers helped with its planning and construction. It became a powerful propaganda symbol of the USSR's transformation into an industrial society.

Coal and iron output doubled during the First Plan, but ambitious targets were not all achieved. Shortages of skilled workers limited progress. Magnitogorsk also revealed the imbalance between industrial construction and people's needs: steel production developed while many workers lived in temporary accommodation with poor sanitation.

The Second Five-Year Plan, 1933–37

The Second Plan continued the expansion of heavy industry, while also developing chemicals, transport and communications. Heavy-industrial production more than doubled, but consumer industries remained neglected.

Transport projects provided visible achievements. The Moscow Metro opened in 1935, and the Moscow–Volga Canal was completed in 1937. These helped demonstrate Soviet engineering capacity. Nevertheless, unrealistic targets and poor-quality output remained problems. Expanding production was not the same as making the economy efficient.

The Stakhanovite Movement: encouraging exceptional output

During the Second Plan, the government used celebrated workers to encourage greater productivity. On 31 August 1935, coal miner Alexei Stakhanov reportedly mined 102 tons of coal in under six hours, about fourteen times his quota. The Stakhanovite Movement was named after him and promoted workers credited with similarly exceptional achievements.

Stakhanov became a national celebrity. He received rewards including extra pay, a new flat and more holidays. Publicity and rewards encouraged other workers to exceed their targets, presenting hard work as both a personal opportunity and a contribution to socialism.

However, his record was not a fair measure of what an ordinary miner could achieve alone. He had assistants and better equipment than many workers possessed. Using such exceptional performances as examples increased pressure on other workers. Attempts to win individual recognition could also disrupt the smooth running of factories. The movement therefore combined incentives and propaganda with practical limitations.

The Third Five-Year Plan and the approach of war

The Third Plan began in 1938. Alongside continued industrial development, its aims included mechanising agriculture and producing some consumer goods. Yet shortages persisted, and Stalin's purges had removed managers and specialists whose skills were needed to organise production.

The plan was interrupted by Germany's invasion of the USSR in June 1941. It did not complete its intended five-year period. By this point, the industrial expansion of the 1930s had strengthened Soviet rearmament and created a much larger industrial base for fighting a major war.

What industrialisation achieved

The greatest gains were in heavy industry. By 1941, the USSR was substantially more industrialised than it had been at the end of the 1920s.

Coal production illustrates the scale of expansion: it rose from 35.5 million tons in 1928 to 165.9 million tons in 1940, almost five times the earlier amount. New industrial cities, including Magnitogorsk, were built. Railways and canals expanded, although transport still struggled to handle the demands placed upon it.

Industrial growth also changed the workforce. People moved from the countryside to industrial towns, increasing the size of the working class, while unemployment almost disappeared. The expanded industrial base strengthened Soviet rearmament and later helped the USSR fight Nazi Germany. This was an important consequence of industrialisation, rather than proof that every production target had been achieved.

Why increased output did not mean complete success

The plans prioritised heavy industry over consumer goods. More steel or coal did not automatically provide more clothes or toiletries, and shortages of everyday products continued. Industrial growth and improvements in people's daily lives were not the same thing.

Targets often emphasised quantity rather than quality. A factory could increase the amount it produced while making goods that were poorly manufactured. Unrealistic targets also placed intense pressure on managers and workers, who could face imprisonment for failing to meet them. This encouraged bribery, corruption and the falsification of production figures, making reported achievements less reliable.

Central planning could be inflexible because decisions were made in advance. When circumstances changed, the system struggled to adjust. Transport inefficiency caused waste and disrupted production, despite the expansion of the transport network.

Rapid development also carried human costs. Dangerous working conditions, harsh pressure to meet targets and inadequate housing accompanied industrial expansion. Forced labour from prisoners in the Gulag camp system was used on major construction projects, with deaths resulting from terrible conditions.

A balanced judgement

Stalin's industrialisation greatly increased heavy-industrial capacity, strengthened state control and helped prepare the USSR for war. However, it did not meet every target or create an efficient economy in every respect. Poor quality, unreliable figures, consumer shortages and severe human costs limited its achievements. The strongest judgement distinguishes success in building industrial power from success in meeting people's needs.