Development of Tension

One aim was to overturn the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler wanted to recover lost territory and rebuild Germany’s military strength. The treaty limited the German army to 100,000 men and prohibited an air force and conscription. Hitler presented these restrictions as unfair, arguing that Germany remained weak while other powers had not disarmed. This claim helped him portray rearmament as a demand for equality rather than preparation for aggression.

He also wanted Grossdeutschland, or ‘Greater Germany’: a state uniting German-speaking peoples. This included Anschluss, the union of Austria and Germany. National self-determination—the idea that peoples should be able to choose their own national future—could make some demands for union appear reasonable. However, it did not justify imposing German rule on unwilling populations.

Hitler’s ambitions went beyond reversing Versailles. Lebensraum, meaning ‘living space’, involved expansion into Eastern Europe. His racist ideology falsely claimed that the so-called Aryan race was superior, while his anti-communism made the Soviet Union an enemy. Territorial expansion and the destruction of communism were therefore connected in his thinking. These were aims, not achievements already secured when he took power.

Why the other powers reacted differently

Britain and France did not immediately confront Hitler. Some European leaders hoped that the Nazis would become more moderate in government. The Great Depression also made economic recovery a priority and restricted the money available for rearmament.

In Britain, there was considerable reluctance to become involved in another European war. Making concessions offered a possible way to settle disputes without fighting. France had greater immediate security concerns because it bordered Germany, but memories of the enormous losses of the First World War encouraged caution there too. French opinion was divided between those demanding firmness and those favouring accommodation.

Other powers had different priorities. The United States wanted to avoid involvement in another European war and did little to oppose Hitler. Stalin’s Soviet Union regarded Nazi anti-communism as a serious threat and warned about Hitler, but these warnings did not produce a united response with Britain and France. Italy, meanwhile, was not yet committed to supporting German expansion: its actions over Austria in 1934 demonstrated that it could oppose Hitler.

These differences mattered. Hitler was dealing not with a single, consistent opposition, but with governments balancing security, economic pressures and the desire to avoid war.

The Dollfuss Affair: resistance stopped an early advance

In 1934, Austrian Nazis assassinated Austria’s Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, during an attempt to seize power. The crisis created an opportunity for Hitler to pursue union with Austria.

However, Mussolini sent Italian troops to the Austrian border at the Brenner Pass. This warned Hitler against exploiting the crisis to bring Austria under German control. Hitler backed down and denied responsibility for Dollfuss’s murder; Anschluss did not take place.

The affair showed that Hitler’s ambitions could be checked when another power gave a credible warning backed by military force. It also shows why it would be misleading to assume that Italy supported Germany throughout the 1930s.

The Saar: a peaceful and legal success

The coal-producing Saar had been placed under League of Nations administration after the First World War. Versailles provided for a plebiscite after 15 years, allowing its population to decide its future.

In January 1935, about 90% voted to return to Germany rather than join France or remain under League control. The Saar consequently returned to Germany.

This was an important success for Hitler, but it was not a breach of Versailles: the vote followed the treaty’s provisions. Germany recovered valuable coal resources and population without fighting. Nazi propaganda presented the result as evidence of support for Hitler and national unity, strengthening his prestige. However, a vote to belong to Germany should not automatically be treated as approval of every Nazi policy.

Rearmament and conscription: an open challenge

Germany had been rearming secretly before Hitler publicly announced its military expansion in March 1935. The announcement revealed the development of an air force and a much larger army. Hitler also introduced conscription, compelling men to serve in the armed forces, with an intended army strength of around 550,000.

These measures directly broke Versailles. An army of this size greatly exceeded the 100,000-man limit, while both the air force and conscription were prohibited. Conscription mattered because it enabled Germany to recruit the manpower needed for rapid military expansion.

Rearmament connected Hitler’s aims to his ability to carry them out. Recovering territory or expanding eastwards would be much easier with stronger armed forces. Openly announcing the changes also tested whether Britain, France and Italy would enforce the settlement rather than merely object to its violation.

The Stresa Front: an attempt at a united response

In April 1935, Britain, France and Italy met at Stresa in Italy. They formed the Stresa Front, condemning German rearmament and agreeing to resist further attempts to change the peace settlement.

Its importance lay in the possibility of joint resistance. The Dollfuss Affair had already demonstrated the effect of Italian opposition; cooperation with Britain and France could make further German advances more difficult.

Yet agreement on a protest did not mean that the three powers shared the same priorities. France wanted security against Germany, Britain favoured negotiation and concessions, and Mussolini pursued Italian ambitions in Africa. These differences made the Front fragile. Britain’s separate naval agreement with Germany soon weakened it, while Italy’s later invasion of Abyssinia and the resulting dispute with Britain and France helped destroy cooperation.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement: limits at the cost of unity

In June 1935, Britain negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement directly with Germany. It permitted a German surface fleet up to 35% of Britain’s. German submarine strength was normally limited to 45% of Britain’s, with provision for it to rise to equality.

Britain saw advantages in an agreed limit: German naval expansion would be controlled, and Britain would retain superiority in surface warships. This was an attempt to manage rearmament through negotiation rather than prevent it altogether.

However, the agreement accepted naval expansion beyond the Versailles restrictions. Britain was therefore permitting part of the rearmament that the Stresa powers had recently condemned. By acting separately from France and Italy, it weakened their common position and confidence in British cooperation.

For Hitler, this was both a military and diplomatic success. Germany gained permission to expand its navy, while the powers opposing it appeared divided. Across 1934–1935, the contrast was significant: firm Italian resistance had helped stop an advance over Austria, but the inconsistent response to rearmament allowed Hitler to strengthen Germany and weakened collective opposition.