Saddam Hussein's Regime

Religious and ethnic divisions in Iraq

Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq in 1979 and ruled through the Ba’ath Party. His regime used intimidation, torture and violence to prevent challenges to its power. Understanding its treatment of different communities requires a distinction between religion and ethnicity.

Sunni and Shia Muslims belong to different branches of Islam. Saddam was a Sunni Muslim, while Shia Muslims formed the majority of Iraq’s population. Despite their numbers, Shias were kept from power under his regime. The Kurds, by contrast, are an ethnic group, not a separate branch of Islam. Kurdish communities lived across several countries, including northern Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Kurdish demands for autonomy or independence challenged Saddam’s control over Iraqi territory.

These divisions mattered because Saddam treated communities associated with opposition as threats to his survival. His repression was therefore about maintaining political control, not simply religious disagreement.

Persecution of the Kurds and the 1991 refugee crisis

Saddam’s persecution of the Kurds began before the 1991 Gulf War. Kurdish demands for an independent state and support for Iran during the Iran–Iraq War made them targets of the regime. Saddam’s forces destroyed hundreds of Kurdish villages and used chemical weapons, including against Halabja in 1988. These attacks killed civilians and drove large numbers of people into neighbouring countries.

After Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, uprisings against Saddam broke out. Rebels initially gained control of many major cities, but the regime recovered and launched a brutal campaign against its opponents. Kurds in the north were among its principal targets.

The resulting flight of civilians became a major refugee crisis. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that about 750,000 Iraqi Kurds fled to Iran, 280,000 to Turkey, and another 300,000 gathered at the Turkish border. These figures show how repression affected not only Iraq but also its neighbours, which had to deal with people fleeing violence.

Repression of Shias and the destruction of the marshes

Shia communities also took part in the 1991 uprisings. Many rebellious cities were predominantly Shia, so Saddam’s forces targeted their populations when the regime regained control.

The treatment of the Marsh Arabs provides a particularly clear example. These Shia communities lived in the wetlands of southern Iraq. After the uprisings, Saddam’s government diverted water from the Tigris and Euphrates, drying out the marshes. This destroyed food sources and made settlements uninhabitable, forcing residents to leave.

The regime also attacked and burnt villages, and there were reports of deliberate poisoning of water. Repression therefore involved more than attacking individual opponents: destroying the environment on which communities depended undermined their ability to remain in the region.

Why condemnation did not lead to Saddam’s removal

Saddam’s treatment of Kurds and Shias, his use of torture and his record of chemical weapons attacks made his regime internationally notorious. Nevertheless, opposition to his brutality did not automatically produce support for removing him.

The USA had encouraged Iraqis to rise against Saddam, but it did not provide direct military assistance to the 1991 rebellions. American leaders wanted to avoid becoming deeply involved in Iraq’s internal affairs. During the 1990s, the US and UK also feared that Saddam’s removal could increase regional instability rather than reduce it.

Turkey’s importance to the USA was another obstacle to supporting Kurdish independence. Turkey was strategically placed between Europe and the Middle East and received American financial and military assistance. It opposed Kurdish separatism within its own borders. Supporting an independent Kurdish state in Iraq risked encouraging similar demands in Turkey and damaging an important American alliance.

International attitudes were therefore shaped by competing priorities: protecting civilians and opposing Saddam’s behaviour, but also preserving alliances and regional stability.

The UN: protection, disarmament and sanctions

After the Gulf War, the United Nations sought to constrain Saddam rather than simply accept his continued behaviour. International responses included humanitarian protection, weapons inspections and economic pressure, although not all measures were imposed by the UN.

Following the repression of the 1991 uprisings, a protected safe haven in northern Iraq helped Kurdish refugees, with protection provided by US troops. The USA, Britain and France also imposed no-fly zones, excluding Iraqi military aircraft from designated airspace to help protect civilians. These were decisions by those governments, rather than a separate UN-imposed system.

Under UN Resolution 687, the United Nations Special Commission, UNSCOM, was established to carry out weapons inspections and oversee the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Inspections were intended to establish what Iraq possessed and prevent it from rebuilding prohibited weapons capabilities.

Sanctions restricted Iraq’s trade and access to military supplies. Their continuation was linked to compliance with disarmament requirements. However, their effects extended far beyond Saddam and his armed forces. Restrictions on trade and reduced oil income contributed to shortages, inflation and poverty. Hospitals struggled to meet basic needs, while damaged electricity, transport and sewage systems could not be adequately rebuilt. UN humanitarian agencies reported malnutrition, disease and high child mortality.

The UN’s oil-for-food programme allowed controlled oil sales to fund food and other essential supplies. Nevertheless, civilian suffering weakened support for the sanctions. Across the Arab world, the USA was widely blamed, while links between Iraq and neighbours including Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran began to recover. Some Arab leaders still found the American military presence reassuring because Saddam remained a potential threat; others resented growing US influence.

Why Iraq gained a reputation as a rogue state

Iraq’s rogue-state reputation rested on its repression, weapons record and defiance of international restraints. Sanctions, occasional bombing and no-fly zones weakened Iraq’s conventional military, particularly by limiting access to spare parts, but did not remove Saddam from power.

Weapons inspections had dismantled substantial parts of Iraq’s prohibited programmes by 1998. Yet relations between the regime and inspectors deteriorated. Inspectors faced obstruction, including crowds of Saddam’s supporters preventing access to sites. Inspections broke down in 1998, and inspectors did not return until 2002.

This interruption increased uncertainty about whether Saddam was rebuilding weapons programmes. American surveillance aircraft could observe sites, but surveillance could not replace inspections inside them. Saddam’s hostile statements towards the West further deepened distrust. His past possession and use of weapons, however, must be distinguished from proof of what he possessed at a later date.

The disputed links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair became determined to confront regimes they believed might support terrorist networks. Bush suspected links between Saddam and Osama bin Laden. A particularly serious fear was that Iraq might provide Al-Qaeda with chemical or biological weapons.

Those arguing that a relationship was possible pointed to Saddam’s previous support for terrorist organisations, including Islamic Jihad. There was also evidence of communication between Iraqi intelligence personnel and Al-Qaeda members. In 1995, a member of Saddam’s government met Al-Qaeda representatives in Sudan. These contacts encouraged suspicion, but contact alone did not prove a joint terrorist operation.

Those doubting the claims emphasised that intelligence had not conclusively demonstrated Iraqi sponsorship of Al-Qaeda. Saddam’s religious outlook was much less fundamentalist than bin Laden’s, making ideological cooperation less likely. None of the 9/11 attackers was Iraqi; most were Saudi Arabian, although Saudi Arabia remained an American ally. Their nationality did not by itself settle the question of sponsorship, but it challenged attempts to associate Iraq directly with the attackers.

Later investigations by the 9/11 Commission and the US Senate found no collaborative operational relationship between Saddam’s regime and Al-Qaeda and no Iraqi support for the 9/11 attacks. These were later findings, not conclusions already established before the invasion. Despite doubts about both terrorist links and Iraq’s weapons capabilities, Bush and Blair proceeded towards plans for war.

Repression and divisions

• Saddam: Sunni Muslim; Shias formed Iraq’s majority but were kept from power.
• Kurds: ethnic group seeking autonomy or independence; persecuted for separatist demands and support for Iran. Chemical attack on Halabja, 1988.
• 1991 uprisings: initial rebel successes followed by brutal repression. Kurdish refugees fled towards Iran and Turkey.
• Marsh Arabs: Shia communities; diversion of the Tigris and Euphrates dried their marshlands, destroying livelihoods and forcing displacement.

International responses and the UN

• USA did not directly assist the 1991 rebellions: avoided involvement in internal affairs, feared instability and prioritised its Turkish alliance.
• Kurdish protection: safe haven in northern Iraq protected by US troops.
• No-fly zones: imposed by the USA, Britain and France.
• Resolution 687: UNSCOM established for weapons inspections and elimination of Iraq’s WMDs.
• Sanctions: constrained Iraq but contributed to civilian poverty, malnutrition and disease. Oil-for-food funded essential supplies through controlled oil sales.

Rogue-state reputation and Al-Qaeda

• Repression, weapons history, hostile rhetoric and obstructed inspections sustained distrust. Inspections stopped in 1998 and resumed in 2002.
• Suspected links: previous terrorist support, intelligence contacts and a 1995 Sudan meeting.
• Doubts: no conclusive proof of sponsorship; ideological differences; no Iraqi 9/11 attackers.
• Later findings: no collaborative operational relationship or Iraqi support for 9/11.
• Distinguish past weapons use, suspected renewed capabilities and proven possession.