Regional Instability

Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, invaded Iran on 22 September 1980. Iran’s 1979 revolution had overthrown the Shah, a ruler supported by the United States, and brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power. Saddam feared revolutionary Iran’s influence within Iraq and hoped to establish Iraq as the leading Gulf power. Control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway also mattered: Iraq had only limited access to the Gulf, making this route economically and strategically important.

The Iran–Iraq War: enormous losses without a decisive victory

After initial Iraqi advances, Iran recovered territory and carried the fighting into Iraq. The conflict developed into a war of attrition: each side tried to exhaust the other rather than achieving a quick victory. Attacks on cities and Iraq’s use of chemical weapons extended the suffering beyond conventional battlefield fighting.

A ceasefire took effect on 20 August 1988. Neither country secured a decisive victory or significant lasting territorial gains. Saddam remained in power, while Iran’s Islamic government survived rather than being overthrown. The war therefore weakened both states without resolving their hostility.

The human cost was immense. Exact totals are uncertain, but several hundred thousand people died, probably half a million or more. Hundreds of thousands suffered serious injuries. Chemical attacks caused thousands of casualties, while bombing and missile attacks brought fear and destruction to civilian communities.

Both countries also faced damaged infrastructure, depleted finances and the costs of rebuilding. Money spent on weapons and fighting could no longer be used for civilian development. Iraq had borrowed heavily, particularly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Its need for oil income and Kuwait’s refusal to forgive its debts left a dangerous financial dispute after the fighting ended. This helped create the conditions for the next Gulf crisis, although debt alone did not make another war inevitable.

Western attitudes: containing Iran and protecting oil

The Iranian Revolution transformed American attitudes towards Iran. The United States lost a friendly ruler and faced an openly anti-Western government. The seizure of American embassy staff in Tehran, who were held hostage for 444 days, deepened that hostility.

During the Iran–Iraq War, Washington generally preferred Iraq to revolutionary Iran. It supplied Iraq with intelligence at various times, but this was not a close alliance based on mutual trust. Supporting Iraq was largely a way of preventing an Iranian victory and limiting Iran’s regional influence.

American policy was also inconsistent. In the secret arms dealings later exposed as the Iran–Contra scandal in 1986, American officials sold weapons to Iran in an effort to obtain the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. These limited sales did not overturn the broader American preference for Iraq.

Oil made the conflict an international economic concern. Iran and Iraq depended on oil exports for earnings, so each attacked shipping to damage the other’s income. Attacks increasingly threatened neutral vessels as well. Gulf oil producers needed safe export routes; Western oil-importing countries wanted reliable supplies at affordable prices. Disruption could therefore damage economies far beyond the battlefield.

In 1987, President Ronald Reagan agreed to place Kuwaiti tankers under the American flag, bringing them under US protection. This protected shipping and benefited Iraq because Kuwait supported it. American involvement also brought direct clashes with Iran. The effort to secure oil supplies thus drew an outside power more deeply into the conflict.

Soviet interests: influence and opposition to revolutionary Iran

For the 1980s, the relevant power was the Soviet Union, of which Russia was a part. Iraq had a longstanding relationship with Moscow, and much of its military equipment was Soviet-made. That relationship gave the USSR influence in a strategically important region, although Iraq’s criticism of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had caused friction.

Iran’s new government was anti-Communist as well as anti-Western. Moscow therefore could not assume that American hostility towards Iran would turn Iran into a Soviet partner. Soviet leaders also worried that a successful Islamic revolution might encourage religious radicalism among the USSR’s own substantial Muslim population.

The United States and Soviet Union were Cold War rivals, but both opposed a decisive Iranian victory. Such a victory might have expanded Iran’s influence, threatened neighbouring Gulf states and placed more oil resources within its reach. This helps explain why Iraq faced relatively limited international pressure over its chemical weapons use: powerful states disliked those weapons, but also feared the consequences of Iraq’s defeat.

Palestine, Israel and tensions beyond the Gulf

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict centred on competing claims to land, national self-determination and security. Israel declared independence in 1948, followed by war with Arab states. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled their homes; Palestinians remember this displacement as the Nakba, or ‘catastrophe’.

In the Six Day War of 1967, Israel captured East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, alongside other territories. Israeli occupation and the unresolved position of Palestinian refugees kept the conflict alive. Israel’s security concerns and Palestinian demands for national rights remained difficult to reconcile.

Although Israel and the Palestinian territories were outside the Gulf, the conflict mattered to Gulf societies and governments. Palestinian displacement became a wider Arab concern, while Jerusalem’s religious importance gave the dispute significance across the Muslim world. After an Australian Christian extremist set fire to the al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, outrage helped bring Muslim countries together in a new international organisation. The episode shows how events in Jerusalem could mobilise opinion far beyond Palestine.

American support for Israel also complicated relations with Arab countries. During the 1973 war, US military assistance helped Israel counter Soviet-armed Egyptian and Syrian forces. Washington wanted to protect Israel while maintaining relations with Arab oil producers such as Saudi Arabia. These interests could pull American policy in different directions.

Grievances, violence and attempts at peace

The conflict generated grievances with an international audience: displacement, occupation, disputed control of Jerusalem and foreign support for the opposing side. Understanding its connection with global terrorism requires distinguishing these grievances from the decisions of particular organisations to use violence. Neither Palestinian identity nor sympathy for Palestinian rights automatically implied support for terrorism.

Political negotiation provided a different response. The 1993 Oslo Accords, negotiated between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, opened a possible route towards a two-state settlement. However, borders, refugees, sovereignty and Jerusalem remained unresolved. Expanding Israeli settlements, Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians and the Second Intifada in 2000 undermined hopes for peace. The persistence of these disputes meant that the conflict continued to contribute to wider regional tension.

How al-Qaeda used the conflict to promote global terrorism

Osama bin Laden, the leader of the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda, used American support for Israel as one of his grievances against the United States. He portrayed conflicts involving Muslims, including the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, as parts of a wider American attack on Islam. This connected a dispute over land and rights in Palestine to his campaign against Americans across the world.

A clear example is the World Islamic Front declaration published on 23 February 1998, signed by bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others. It condemned Israeli control of Jerusalem and claimed that American policy towards Iraq served Israel’s interests. It called for killing Americans and their allies, including civilians, wherever possible, presenting this as a way to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and remove American forces from Muslim lands. Its worldwide targets show how its authors sought to turn regional grievances into motives for global terrorism. These were extremist claims and demands, not an accepted religious duty or evidence that their allegations were true.

The Palestinian conflict was therefore an important grievance in al-Qaeda’s propaganda, helping it appeal to people angered by occupation and US support for Israel. However, it was not the sole cause of al-Qaeda’s violence. The same declaration condemned US troops in Saudi Arabia and the suffering of Iraqis under sanctions after the Gulf War. Bin Laden’s wider extremist ideology also supported indiscriminate killing and demanded much more than a settlement in Palestine. The conflict contributed to his stated motives, but those motives must be understood alongside other regional grievances and al-Qaeda’s own ideological aims.